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The Lost Language of the First 
Amendment in Copyright Fair Use: 
A Semiotic Perspective of the 
“Transformative Use” Doctrine 
Twenty-Five Years On 
David Tan* 
 
It has been twenty-five years since Judge Pierre Leval published his 
iconic article, “Toward a Fair Use Standard,” urging that courts adopt 
a new guiding principle of “transformative use” to determine whether 
an unauthorized secondary use of a copyrighted work is fair. The Su-
preme Court’s emphatic endorsement of this approach in 1994 has re-
sulted in a remarkable judicial expansion of the transformative use doc-
trine which today covers virtually any “creation of new information, 
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.” While the Supreme 
Court reiterated in Golan v. Holder in 2012 that the fair use defense is 
one of copyright law’s key “built-in First Amendment accommoda-
tions,” the influence of the First Amendment on the transformative use 
doctrine remains largely unexplored over the years. This Article analyzes 
how the different theoretical underpinnings of the First Amendment and 
certain categories of First Amendment-protected speech have been ac-
commodated within the transformative use doctrine, and shows how the 
First Amendment has been—and will continue to be—the invisible hand 
that shapes the development of copyright law. It also addresses the unre-
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Law in the 21st Century conference in Singapore, and Kenneth Wang Ye and Benjamin 
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lenting frustration in assessing transformative use and urges a consider-
ation for assistance from a semiotic perspective of the First Amendment 
to illuminate what really are cultural contestations of semiotic signs 
masquerading as copyright disputes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
First Amendment jurisprudence is replete with symbolic ex-
pression that qualifies for constitutional protection. The Supreme 
Court has explicitly acknowledged that burning the American flag 
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can be construed as a legitimate form of political protest,1 and plac-
ing a burning cross on the fenced yard of a black family connotes 
“virulent notions of racial supremacy” but is nonetheless a pro-
tected expression of particular ideas.2 However, in a copyright dis-
pute, while spray-painting a red cross over the image of a scream-
ing face in a music video was seen to convey a critical message 
about the hypocrisy of religion, there was no mention of the First 
Amendment.3 Similarly, replacing the romantic lyrics of “Oh, Pret-
ty Woman” with tawdry ones was perceived to be a “comment on 
the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sen-
timent that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement 
that it signifies,”4 but there was no reference to its contribution to 
the marketplace of ideas.5 
In 2014, the Supreme Court in McCullen v. Coakley reiterated 
that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is “to preserve 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.”6 In the same year, the Court also highlighted in McCut-
cheon v. Federal Election Commission that there is “no right more 
basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our 
political leaders”7 and that the “First Amendment safeguards an 
individual’s right to participate in the public debate through politi-
cal expression and political association.”8 The Supreme Court has 
exhorted that First Amendment standards “must give the benefit 
of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”9 
                                                                                                                            
1 E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (“We have had little difficulty 
identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags . . . . The very purpose of a 
national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, the one visible 
manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood.”). 
2 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 356–57, 363, 389–91 (2003); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392, 394 (1992). 
3 Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 
4 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
5 Id. 
6 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (citing FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). 
7 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014). 
8 Id. at 1448 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). 
9 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 327 (2010); see also Fed. 
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
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Although political speech, or conduct expressing a clear politi-
cal message, enjoys heightened First Amendment protection, the 
Supreme Court has found that literature, music, and the visual and 
performing arts also qualify for constitutional protection even in 
the absence of conveying a clear political message or touching on a 
matter of public concern. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston, the Supreme Court held that “a nar-
row, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitu-
tional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a par-
ticularized message would never reach the unquestionably shielded 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jab-
berwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”10 
Hurley poses some important theoretical questions about the 
rationale for extending First Amendment protection to literary, 
musical, dramatic and artistic works, and consequently the en-
forcement of copyright and its potential chilling effect on freedom 
of speech. However, while First Amendment case law, in terms of 
challenging the constitutional validity of state action, is filled with 
references to the constitutionally protected status of literary, musi-
cal, dramatic, and artistic works,11 courts have rarely discussed the 
underlying rationales for such protection in copyright litigation. 
The tension between copyright interests and the First Amendment 
is apparent. The Copyright Act, enacted by Congress under the 
authority of the U.S. Constitution’s Copyright Clause, grants indi-
viduals monopoly-like power to preclude others from using copy-
                                                                                                                            
10 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(internal citation omitted). 
11 See Nat’l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998) 
(“Constitutional protection of artistic works turns not on the political significance that 
may be attributable to such productions, though they may indeed comment on the 
political, but simply on their expressive character.”); Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 
689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Paintings, photographs, prints and sculptures . . . are entitled to 
full First Amendment protection.”); Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 759 F.2d 625, 628 
(7th Cir. 1985) (“The First Amendment has been interpreted to embrace purely artistic 
as well as political expression.”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 
501 (1952) (protecting motion pictures that “may affect public attitudes and behavior in a 
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle 
shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression”); David Greene, Why 
Protect Political Art as “Political Speech”?, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 362 
(2005) (explaining that visual art falls under the aegis of the First Amendment). 
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righted material in their expression.12 It is this “paradox” that 
creates the tension: copyright laws grant a copyright owner the 
right to suppress or abridge another person’s freedom of speech 
when that person seeks to express copyrighted material. However, 
on a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected any fur-
ther independent consideration of the impact of the First Amend-
ment on copyright law, pronouncing that “copyright law contains 
built-in First Amendment accommodations.”13 As a “traditional 
contour” of copyright law, the Court had held that the “fair use 
defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship and com-
ment . . . even for parody.”14 Justice Ginsburg, delivering the opi-
nion of the Court in Golan v. Holder, emphasized the “‘speech-
protective purposes and safeguards’ embraced by copyright law”15 
and assured that the public may freely use the author’s expression 
“in certain circumstances.”16 Unfortunately, in all the decisions 
concerning challenges to copyright legislation passed by Congress, 
the Supreme Court did not elaborate on how First Amendment ju-
risprudence might actually be relevant in determining the ambit of 
such safeguards.17 
Indeed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Golan makes it clear that 
the fair use defense has “constitutional import” and “reaffirms 
that copyright law poses a First Amendment paradox that cannot 
be ignored.”18 This Article adopts the premise that the key under-
                                                                                                                            
12 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
13 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 
890 (2012); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
14 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20. 
15 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219); see generally Matthew D. 
Bunker, Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First 
Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273 
(2009); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, 
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
16 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219). 
17 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186 (concerning the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act 
extending the duration of copyrights by twenty years); see also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873 
(concerning section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act granting copyright 
protection to works protected in their country of origin, but lacking protection in the 
United States). 
18 Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v. 
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1128 (2013). 
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lying rationales of the First Amendment are the promotion of a 
marketplace of ideas and the advancement of a democracy where 
the public can freely participate in deliberating issues important to 
decisionmaking in a democracy (a “participatory democracy”). It 
contends that in many decisions that have applied the transforma-
tive use doctrine in extending the fair use privilege to infringing 
works, the results are often compatible with, and perhaps even in-
fluenced by, covert First Amendment considerations. 
A well-known literary or artistic work does much more than 
simply educate, inform, or entertain, but it also functions as a sig-
nifier of a set of signified meanings. As many famous copyrighted 
works are important semiotic signs in contemporary society, I fur-
ther propose that the augmentation of these theories of the First 
Amendment with semiotic insights is likely to lead to better out-
comes in cases because more speech of “greater” constitutional 
value is protected (i.e., speech that contributes to an increased 
awareness and debate of public issues). “Interdisciplinarity has be-
come a transforming force within legal studies,” and its advantages 
have been well canvassed.19 Ideological discourses of a particular 
society can be classified and framed through semiotic signs 
represented by well-known copyrighted works. A particular work 
that is symbolic of a privileged public identity can be seen to 
represent a majoritarian ideological position—a form of “frozen 
speech”20—and is, therefore, open to a recoding challenge by oth-
ers to express their cultural identities and convey their political 
ideologies.21 For example, a challenge to the ideas embodied in the 
Gone With The Wind novel may be presented in the form of another 
novel titled The Wind Done Gone which uses the characters in the 
original novel but portrays them differently in order to make “a 
                                                                                                                            
19 See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY xii (2001). 
20 ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 124 (Annette Lavers trans., 1972) (1957). 
21 More recently, recoding—in a copyright context—has been defined to be “the 
appropriation of a copyrighted cultural object for new expression in a way that ascribes a 
different meaning to it than intended by its creator.” See Note, “Recoding” and the 
Derivative Works Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1488, 1488 (2006); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a 
Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597 
(2007). 
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critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, 
judgments, and mythology of [the original work]” and “to explode 
the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and 
after the Civil War.”22 This Article suggests that free speech inter-
ests may be enhanced by a pragmatic understanding of semiotics 
that seeks to attain a “wide reflective equilibrium [that is] firmly 
grounded in constitutional reality.”23 
In U.S. fair use jurisprudence, the first statutory factor of fair 
use—the “purpose and character of the use”—is examined in the 
context of the transformative nature of the infringing work. Gener-
ally, a transformative work is one that imbues the original “with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”24 According to the Supreme 
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., transformativeness not 
only occupies the core of the fair use doctrine but also reduces the 
importance of all other factors such that “the more transformative 
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”25 
Part I examines the current scope of the first factor of fair use as 
codified in section 107 of the United States Copyright Act 1976. It 
traces the judicial development of the “transformative use” doc-
trine as articulated by Pierre Leval twenty-five years ago and high-
lights the dispositive force that this concept commands today in the 
fair use analysis. It further argues that copyright fair use jurispru-
dence today, in particular the decisions of the Second and Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, despite having virtually no reference to 
the First Amendment, is nonetheless highly protective of speech. 
Part II will show that First Amendment jurisprudence, espe-
cially Supreme Court decisions, while consistently paying tribute to 
a marketplace of ideas, inevitably supports an overarching ap-
proach to the First Amendment in terms of a participatory theory 
that places the highest constitutional value on political speech. It 
contends that that many works protected by copyright law also 
possess significant sets of established meanings and connotations to 
                                                                                                                            
22 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001). 
23 BUNKER, supra note 19, at 197. 
24 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
25 Id. 
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the public which utilize these works in the expressive process of 
social identity formation and democratic discourse, with these sec-
ondary works falling clearly within protected categories of speech. 
Part III interrogates how the prevailing test of whether the orig-
inal copyrighted work was employed “in the creation of new in-
formation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” has 
not only adequately accommodated the First Amendment, but is in 
fact driven by an underlying free speech ethos that is evident in 
other areas of intellectual property like trademark and right of pub-
licity laws. It postulates that viewing copyrighted works as semiotic 
signs can assist both the development of First Amendment and 
copyright jurisprudence. Using well-known cartoon and superhero 
characters, it illustrates how an evaluation of “transformative use” 
essentially embeds notions of sustaining a vibrant marketplace of 
ideas and promoting participatory democracy within copyright fair 
use analysis. It also highlights the recoding potential of famous 
works, especially as used by subaltern groups or counterpublics as 
an integral part of political and social identity formation. This Ar-
ticle concludes that this approach to fair use allows greater breath-
ing space for the First Amendment within copyright jurisprudence, 
and it can better protect political speech in a manner that more ef-
fectively negotiates the competing right of the copyright owner to 
exploit the commercial value of his or her work, and the right of the 
public to use the work as an expressive communicative symbolic 
resource in a participatory democracy. 
I. PIERRE LEVAL’S TRANSFORMATIVE USE DOCTRINE—
THEN & NOW 
The fair use defense is widely believed to have its American 
origins in Justice Story’s test for a fair and bona fide abridgement 
as set out in his 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh.26 If prima facie 
copyright infringement was found, the fair use defense as codified 
in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act can nonetheless provide a 
safe harbor for the defendant, especially if transformative elements 
may be discerned in the infringing work. 
                                                                                                                            
26 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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Section 107 states: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purpos-
es such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright. In determining whether the use made 
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the fac-
tors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.27 
A. Pierre Leval’s Transformative Use Doctrine in 1990 
Pierre Leval, then a judge of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, published an influential ar-
ticle in 1990 that considered whether imprecision—the absence of 
a clear standard—in fair use doctrine was a strength or a weak-
ness.28 Leval noted that “throughout the development of the fair 
use doctrine, courts had failed to fashion a set of governing prin-
ciples or values”29 but was concerned that fair use “should be per-
ceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copy-
right, nor as a departure from the principles governing that body of 
law, but rather as a rational, integral part of copyright.”30 Referring 
to the Copyright Clause,31 he argued that by lumping together au-
thors and inventors, writings and discoveries, the express text sug-
gests the rough equivalence of these two activities, and therefore 
                                                                                                                            
27 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
28 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
29 Id. at 1105. 
30 Id. at 1107. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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the goal of both copyright and patent laws is utilitarian in nature. 
More specifically, copyright law: 
[E]mbodies a recognition that creative intellectual 
activity is vital to the well-being of society. It is a 
pragmatic measure by which society confers mono-
poly-exploitation benefits for a limited duration on 
authors and artists (as it does for inventors), in or-
der to obtain for itself the intellectual and practical 
enrichment that results from creative endeavors.32 
Leval acknowledged that monopoly protection of intellectual 
property that restricted referential analysis and the development of 
new ideas out of the old would strangle the creative process, and 
thought that the idea-expression dichotomy, facts-exclusion rule 
and fair use doctrine all provided a counterbalance. In particular, 
he advocated instilling a coherent and useful set of principles in the 
fair use doctrine, such that “the use must be of a character that 
serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought 
and public instruction without excessively diminishing the incen-
tives for creativity.”33 
In his analysis of the four statutory fair use factors, Leval was of 
the view that factor one—the “purpose and character of the 
use”—is the “soul of fair use.”34 Explaining that this considera-
tion raises the question of justification (i.e., “Does the use fulfill 
the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public il-
lumination?”35), he emphasized that the answer turns primarily on 
whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative. 
Leval frames the inquiry as follows: 
The use must be productive and must employ the 
quoted matter in a different manner or for a differ-
ent purpose from the original . . . . [If] the secondary 
use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter 
is used as raw material, transformed in the creation 
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights 
                                                                                                                            
32 Leval, supra note 28, at 1109. 
33 Id. at 1109–10. 
34 Id. at 1116. 
35 Id. at 1111. 
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and understandings—this is the very type of activity 
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the 
enrichment of society.36 
Leval also provided some examples of transformative use which 
included “criticizing the quoted work, exposing the character of 
the original author, . . . or summarizing an idea argued in the origi-
nal in order to defend or rebut it” and “parody, symbolism, [and] 
aesthetic declarations.”37 Interestingly, while Leval conceded that 
“copyright often results in suppression of speech,”38 he avoided 
any discussion of the First Amendment and peremptorily declared 
“the Framers intended copyright . . . to be the engine of free ex-
pression”39 and it “is intended to increase and not to impeded the 
harvest of knowledge.”40 
B. The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of Transformative Use in 1994 
The phrase “transformative use” has surged into prominence 
in fair use jurisprudence ever since the Supreme Court in 1994 em-
braced transformativeness as the cynosure of fair use in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.41 The decision is important in its emphasis 
on how a highly transformative use of an original work may qualify 
the secondary infringing work for fair use protection even if the lat-
ter was commercial in nature, rebutting earlier presumptions in 
cases like Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises42 and Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios.43 
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad 
called “Oh, Pretty Woman” and assigned their rights in it to 
Acuff-Rose Music. In 1989, Luke Campbell, from the controversial 
                                                                                                                            
36 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1135. 
39 Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985)). 
40 Id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545). 
41 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The controversial rap 
group 2 Live Crew sampled the distinctive bass line from Roy Orbison’s original hit song 
“Pretty Woman,” used the same title for their parody song, and replaced the romantic 
lyrics with talk about a big hairy woman and her exploits. Id. at 582, 588. 
42 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539. 
43 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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rap group 2 Live Crew, wrote a song entitled “Pretty Woman,” 
which was intended, “through comical lyrics, to satirize the origi-
nal work.”44 The manager of 2 Live Crew wrote to Acuff-Rose of-
fering to pay a license fee for the use of the original song, but Acuff-
Rose refused permission. Nonetheless, 2 Live Crew proceeded to 
release records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of the parody 
song “Pretty Woman” in a collection of songs entitled As Clean As 
They Wanna Be. The albums and compact discs identify the au-
thors of “Pretty Woman” as Orbison and Dees and its publisher as 
Acuff-Rose. Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million 
copies of the recording had been sold, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live 
Crew and its record company for copyright infringement. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew on the 
ground of fair use and held that 2 Live Crew’s version was a parody 
that “quickly degenerates into a play on words, substituting pre-
dictable lyrics with shocking ones” to show “how bland and banal 
the Orbison song” is. The court also found that 2 Live Crew had 
taken no more of the original than was necessary to “conjure up” 
the original in order to parody it, and that it was “extremely unlike-
ly that 2 Live Crew’s song could adversely affect the market for the 
original.”45 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed 
and remanded, observing that the district court had put too little 
emphasis on the fact that “every commercial use . . . is presump-
tively . . . unfair,”46 and that the effect on the potential market for 
the original (and the market for derivative works) is “undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use.”47 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Souter, writing for a 
unanimous court, examined the legislative history of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 and concluded that the first factor in a fair use inquiry—“the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”—
should be examined with reference to its transformative nature in 
                                                                                                                            
44 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a). 
45 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1154–55, 1157–58 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1991). 
46 Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 451. 
47 Harper & Row, 471 U.S at 566. 
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the manner that Pierre Leval has argued in his 1990 law review ar-
ticle. Justice Souter held: 
The central purpose of this investigation is to 
see . . . whether the new work merely “supersede[s] 
the objects” of the original creation (“supplanting” 
the original), or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it 
asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the 
new work is “transformative.”48 
More emphatically, Justice Souter laid the groundwork for the 
transformative use doctrine—especially for commercial parodies, 
appropriation art, and fan communities—to flourish over the next 
two decades: 
[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science and the 
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of trans-
formative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of 
the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space 
within the confines of copyright, . . . and the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, 
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.49 
In response to the Campbell decision, Pierre Leval hailed Jus-
tice Souter’s opinion as “perceptive and profound” and was de-
lighted that it had “restored order and good sense to fair use”50; he 
also believed that it was “the finest opinion ever written on the 
subject of fair use.”51 In particular, Leval thought it was important 
that the Souter opinion “kills the canard that commercial use is 
presumptively unfair.”52 Although the Campbell decision down-
played the commerciality of the infringing use and directed the in-
quiry to the transformativeness of secondary work, it nevertheless 
                                                                                                                            
48 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 28, at 1111 (internal citations 
omitted)). 
49 Id. 
50 Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1451 
(1997). 
51 Id. at 1464. 
52 Id. 
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generated tremendous confusion in respect of the application of the 
transformative use doctrine to parodic and satirical works. Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court only provided one concrete example 
of a sufficiently transformative use that would clearly lead to a fair 
use determination, that of parody. Justice Souter usefully sug-
gested that the “threshold question when fair use is raised in de-
fense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be 
perceived.”53 Regarding the “Pretty Woman” song in dispute, Jus-
tice Souter conceded that it would not be “assign[ed] a high rank 
to the parodic element here,” but found that 2 Live Crew’s song 
“reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or 
criticizing it, to some degree.”54 
Over the years, lower courts have bluntly asserted that because 
a parody targets and comments on the original work, it is therefore 
transformative; on the other hand, a satire uses the original work as 
a weapon to comment on something else and is thus not transfor-
mative.55 But the Campbell court did not state that in order for a use 
to be transformative it must always comment on the original. Jus-
tice Souter explained that “[p]arody needs to mimic an original to 
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its vic-
tim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand 
on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of 
borrowing.”56 
                                                                                                                            
53 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
54 Id. at 583. Justice Souter was of the view that: 
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy 
comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a 
sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be 
taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as 
a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and 
the debasement that it signifies. 
Id. 
55 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“It is the rule in this Circuit that though the satire need not be only of the 
copied work and may . . . also be a parody of modern society, the copied work must be, at 
least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there would be no need to conjure up the 
original work.”). 
56 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81. Justice Souter also commented that “parody often 
shades into satire when society is lampooned through its creative artifacts, or that a work 
may contain both parodic and nonparodic elements.” Id. at 581. 
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In a footnote, the Court clarified that: 
[W]hen there is little or no risk of market substitution, 
whether because of the large extent of transformation of 
the earlier work, the new work’s minimal distribution 
in the market, the small extent to which it borrows 
from an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim 
at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and 
looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, 
as may satire with lesser justification for the borrow-
ing than would otherwise be required.57 
This suggests that the degree or extent of transformation is the 
salient feature of the first factor of fair use regardless of whether 
the secondary use is classified as a parody, satire, or something 
else. 
With respect to the first factor of fair use, this approach re-
quires courts to examine the “purpose and character of the use,” 
but neither “purpose” nor “character” is defined in the statute. 
Courts therefore may consider a kaleidoscope of relevant factors 
like what kind of transformation is present in the secondary work, 
the track record of the author of the secondary work, the extent of 
commentary or criticism present in the secondary work, the signi-
ficance of the secondary use to research or study, as well as its pub-
lic benefit.58 Indeed, the transformative use doctrine in the first fac-
tor of fair use is a difficult one to elucidate. The phrase “the pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes” sug-
gests that (a) a change in the purpose of the secondary infringing 
work vis-à-vis the original work (i.e., from entertaining to educa-
tional) or a change in character (i.e., change in context or style) is 
transformative; (b) such changes should be considered in the light 
of the commerciality of the secondary infringing work, although 
this examination overlaps with the fourth factor on market impact; 
and (c) whether the secondary infringing work serves a commercial 
or nonprofit purpose, is a separate consideration from the “pur-
                                                                                                                            
57 Id. at 580 n.14 (emphasis added). 
58 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
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pose and character of the use.” Courts do not usually observe a 
strict distinction between “purpose” and “character,” preferring 
to assess whether the secondary work was sufficiently transforma-
tive according to the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in 
Campbell. 
C. The Ascendancy of Transformative Use from 1994–2015 
The transformative use test has become the defining standard 
for fair use, and it has risen to the top of the agenda of the copy-
right academic community in the United States in the last five 
years.59 Jane Ginsburg, in her review of the most significant devel-
opments in copyright law in the period 1992–2012, concludes that 
the last twenty years have marked the “extraordinary expansion” 
of the fair use doctrine, and in particular, the concept of transfor-
mative use, with recent cases demonstrating a shift from focusing 
on finding a “transformative work” to discovering a “transforma-
tive purpose.”60At least four empirical studies of United States fair 
use case law offer valuable insights to the transformative use doc-
trine. 
Barton Beebe’s pioneering empirical study of fair use decisions 
in the United States, which covered judicial opinions from 1978 to 
2005,61 and Matthew Sag’s statistical analysis, which focused on 
the ex ante predictability of fair use based on 280 fair use cases de-
cided between 1978 and 2011,62 affirm the important role that 
transformative use—a judicial inquiry in the first statutory factor of 
the fair use inquiry when examining the “the purpose and charac-
ter of the use”—plays in the evaluation of fair use. Beebe observed: 
[I]n those opinions in which transformativeness did 
play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not 
                                                                                                                            
59 See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: 
Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92 (2014); Michael D. Murray, What is Transformative? 
An Explanatory Synthesis of the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in 
Copyright Fair Use Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012). 
60 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright 1992–2012: The Most Significant Development?, 23 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 465, 487–89 (2013). 
61 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008). 
62 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012). 
2016] LOST LANGUAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 327 
 
simply on the outcome of factor one but on the 
overall outcome of the fair use test. More specifical-
ly, the data suggest that while a finding of transfor-
mativeness is not necessary to trigger an overall 
finding of fair use, it is sufficient to do so.63 
While courts have not demonstrated an overriding desire to 
find transformativeness in the cases before them, Beebe concludes 
that based on the regression analysis, if a use were found to be 
transformative, the defendant’s chance of winning the fair use de-
fense would be 94.9%.64 Sag more confidently asserts that the evi-
dence “confirms the centrality of transformative use” and when 
“[m]easured in terms of the variable Creativity Shift, it appears 
that transformative use by the defendant is a robust predictor of a 
finding of fair use.”65 Sag also concludes that an assessment of 
transformativeness is “not merely a question of the degree of dif-
ference between two works; rather, it requires a judgment of the 
motivation and meaning of those differences.”66 
However, it is Neil Netanel’s study of U.S. district and circuit 
court cases decided between 2006 and 2010 that is more conclusive 
that “the transformative use paradigm ascended to its overwhel-
mingly predominant position only after 2005, following the period 
that Beebe studied.”67 Although courts have repeatedly asserted 
that a secondary use need not be transformative in order to be a fair 
use, and that transformativeness as encapsulated in the first statu-
tory fair use factor is merely a part, albeit a central part, of the fair 
use inquiry, Netanel’s data reveals that there is certainly a striking-
ly high correlation between judicial findings regarding transforma-
tiveness and fair use outcomes.68 The leading cases also “make 
                                                                                                                            
63 Beebe, supra note 61, at 605. 
64 Id. at 606. 
65 Sag, supra note 62, at 84. 
66 Id. at 56. 
67 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 
734 (2011). 
68 Id. at 742. Twenty of the twenty-two opinions that found the defendant’s use to be 
“highly,” “certainly,” or “significantly” transformative, or just simply 
“transformative,” held that the defendant had engaged in fair use. All but three cases that 
characterized the secondary use in question as non-transformative, or only “minimally,” 
“partly,” or “somewhat” transformative, found no fair use. Id. at 740–41. 
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quite clear that, in effect, if the first factor favors fair use, that will 
trump the fourth factor.”69 
Finally, Michael Murray’s explanatory synthesis methodology, 
a process of induction of principles of interpretation and applica-
tion concerning the prevailing rules governing a specific legal issue, 
has been applied to the entire body of copyright fair use case law 
from the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals since 1994.70 His study 
revealed that “placing [existing copyrighted work] in a new context 
so as to change the predominant purpose and function of the original 
material is transformative.”71 In Murray’s explanatory synthesis of 
decisions rendered by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, he con-
cludes: 
A change in context for an artistic work even with-
out any changes to the content of the work may be 
sufficient if the predominant purpose and function 
of the new work is sufficiently different from the 
original work and fulfills one of the [principal] goals 
of the copyright laws.72 
Although Campbell involved parody, where the rap group 2 
Live Crew directly commented on the original “Oh, Pretty Wom-
an” song by Roy Orbison, the Supreme Court did not hold or even 
suggest that transformativeness is limited to new works that parody 
the original or comment on it directly. In Campbell, the Court ob-
served that section 107 “employs the terms ‘including’ and ‘such 
as’ in the preamble paragraph to indicate the ‘illustrative and not 
limitative’ function of the examples given, which thus provide only 
general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and Con-
gress most commonly had found to be fair uses.”73 It is clear that if 
Congress had intended to impose a requirement that all secondary 
                                                                                                                            
69 Id. at 743. This is likely to be a result of the conclusion that if a secondary use is 
unequivocally transformative, then, by definition, it causes no market harm to or has 
market substitution for the original work. Perhaps more controversially, Sag surmises that 
the near-perfect correlation between judicial findings on the fourth factor and fair use case 
outcomes must mean that the fourth factor is not really an independent variable in judges’ 
fair use analysis. See Sag, supra note 62, at 63–64. 
70 Murray, supra note 59. 
71 Id. at 276 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 279. 
73 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994). 
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works must comment, it would have done so by adding a comment 
requirement as a conjunctive element, or by exclusively providing 
that only those activities listed in section 107 can qualify as fair use. 
Most of the Circuit Court decisions in the last decade on fair 
use have hailed from the Second and Ninth Circuits, with a handful 
from the Federal,74 First,75 Third,76 Fourth,77 Tenth,78 Seventh,79 
and Eleventh80 Circuits, and virtually nothing of note from the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. The Second Circuit has consi-
dered a broader examination of transformation that does not re-
quire the presence of comment so long as the purpose in using the 
original work is “plainly different from the original purpose for 
which [it was] created”81 and have “given weight to an artist’s own 
explanation of their creative rationale when conducting the fair use 
analysis.”82 The Second Circuit found in Blanch v. Koons that Jeff 
Koons’ use of Andrea Blanch’s photograph to be transformative 
even though he was not commenting on the underlying work but 
using the original image “as fodder for his commentary on the so-
cial and aesthetic consequences of mass media.”83 The court ex-
pressly “disagree[d] with the suggestion that comment or criti-
cism” is required to show transformative use,84 and emphasized 
                                                                                                                            
74 See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
75 See, e.g., Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st 
Cir. 2012). 
76 See, e.g., Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011). 
77 See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013); A.V. ex 
rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
78 See, e.g., Shell v. DeVries, No. 07-1086, 2007 WL 4269047, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 
2007). 
79 See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Brownmark 
Films LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012). 
80 See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
81 Blanch v. Koons (Koons II), 467 F.3d 244, 252–53 (2d Cir. 2006); Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006). 
82 Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507–08 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Koons II, 467 F.3d at 255). 
83 Koons II, 467 F.3d at 253. It may be argued that Rogers v. Koons (Koons I), is of limited 
precedential value as it was decided before Campbell, and there was no requirement in law 
for a secondary work to comment on the original work so long as the intent of the 
secondary author was to recode the original expression into entirely new expression with 
new messages. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
84 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 609. 
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that the inquiry should be whether the secondary work may be rea-
sonably perceived to have a meaning, message, or purpose that is 
“separate and distinct” from the original,85 consistent with the 
judgment in Campbell.86 
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have also rejected a narrow re-
quirement of commenting or criticizing the original work in order 
to qualify as transformative use, directing the court instead to ex-
amine whether the infringing work has employed the copyrighted 
work in a different manner or for a different purpose from the orig-
inal, thus transforming it.87 Such a broader interpretation that fo-
cuses judicial inquiry on evaluating a change in purpose or change 
in character can better unify the transformative use analysis for ex-
pressive parodic, satirical, or critical works and non-expressive 
works in a technological medium like format- or time-shifting. 
Moreover, from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Ama-
zon.com,88 it appears that in evaluating the first statutory factor, 
courts may be inclined to assess the extent of the “transformative 
nature” of the defendant’s secondary use “in light of its public 
benefit,” and weigh that against the defendant’s “superseding and 
commercial uses.”89 These decisions, taking a more permissive 
view of fair use, have collectively resulted in allowing a significant 
amount of expressive works to be made available to the public. 
                                                                                                                            
85 Id.; see also Koons II, 467 F.3d at 252; Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 
Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d. Cir. 1998). 
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Swatch Grp. Mgmt. 
Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP, 742 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In the context of news 
reporting and analogous activities, moreover, the need to convey information to the 
public accurately may in some instances make it desirable and consonant with copyright 
law for a defendant to faithfully reproduce an original work rather than transform it. In 
such cases, courts often find transformation by emphasizing the altered purpose or 
context of the work, as evidenced by surrounding commentary or criticism.”). 
87 See, e.g., Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 932, 301 (4th Cir. 2010); A.V. 
ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 
F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003). 
88 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. 
89 Id. at 1166. 
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The transformative use doctrine, as consistently articulated by 
the Second Circuit for over a decade, was succinctly stated by the 
court in 2013: 
If the secondary use adds value to the original—if 
[the original work] is used as raw material, trans-
formed in the creation of new information, new aes-
thetics, new insights and understandings—this is 
the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine in-
tends to protect for the enrichment of society.90 
This formulation was lifted verbatim from Leval’s 1990 ar-
ticle.91 The Second Circuit did not require the secondary work to 
comment on the original work or on the original author/artist, so 
long as a transformative nature may “reasonably be perceived.”92 
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Campbell that the 2 Live Crew version of “Pretty Woman” could 
“reasonably be perceived as commenting on the original or criticiz-
ing it, to some degree” because “2 Live Crew juxtaposes the ro-
mantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, with degrading 
taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal 
responsibility.”93 More importantly, the Ninth Circuit aligned it-
self with the Second Circuit in adopting Leval’s formulation—
whether “the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in 
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings”—in Seltzer v. Green Day in 2013.94 All Circuit 
Courts have either directly cited the Leval formulation, Campbell, 
or the Second Circuit’s 1998 decision of Castle Rock Entertainment, 
Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. as authority for the evaluation of 
fair use. Generally, courts have found a transformative purpose 
both where the defendant combines copyrighted expression with 
                                                                                                                            
90 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 
142); see also Koons II, 467 F.3d at 251–52. A recent decision of the Seventh Circuit was 
less enamored with this approach. See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 
(7th Cir. 2014) (“We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, because asking exclusively 
whether something is “transformative” not only replaces the list in [section] 107 but also 
could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works.”). 
91 Leval, supra note 28, at 1111. 
92 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. 
93 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
94 Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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original expression to produce a new creative work, and where the 
defendant uses a copyrighted work in a different context to serve a 
different function than the original.95 When an “allegedly infring-
ing work is typically viewed as transformative as long as new ex-
pressive content or message is apparent” (Ninth Circuit),96 or 
when “[w]hat is critical is how the work in question appears to the 
reasonable observer” (Second Circuit),97 the effect of this modified 
Leval test of transformative use is highly protective of speech. 
There are five broad categories of transformative uses that can 
be said to demonstrate a change in “purpose” or “character” as 
articulated in 17 U.S.C § 107. In summary, the following types of 
uses have been found to be transformative: 
(1) Directly commenting on or criticizing the 
original work, or targeting the original work for 
ridicule or parody;98 
(2) Using the original work to comment on 
something else or in a satire, but the secondary 
                                                                                                                            
95 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
96 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1177. 
97 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707. 
98 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (holding that the 2 Live Crew song can be taken as a 
comment on the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that 
ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies, and is therefore 
transformative); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that 
analyses and critiques of course manuals are transformative); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that, despite borrowing substantially 
from Margaret Mitchell’s original novel, The Wind Done Gone was found to be a 
transformative use of Gone With the Wind as it is a direct critique of Mitchell’s depiction 
of slavery and the Civil-War era American South); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the parody ad may reasonably be 
perceived as commenting on the seriousness, even the pretentiousness, of the original). 
But see Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that a poetic account of the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial entitled The Cat 
NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice was not transformative as The Cat in the Hat is not 
conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O.J. Simpson trial); 
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a fictional novel 
recounting a meeting of Catcher in the Rye’s Holden Caulfield at the age of seventy-six 
with the author of that same book, J.D. Salinger, was a substantial copy of the original 
novel and was unlikely to constitute fair use). 
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work nonetheless contains some underlying 
critical relevance to the original work;99 
(3) Recontextualizing the original work without 
modification but changing the meaning of the 
original work, often in an appropriation art 
context;100 
(4) Changing the purpose of the original work 
within an expressive context (e.g., from 
entertainment to education or research);101 and 
                                                                                                                            
99 See Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the use of an already 
published photograph in a painting was transformative because it had an entirely different 
purpose and meaning); Mattel Inc., v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding that photographs portraying nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage 
kitchen appliances are transformative as they comment on Barbie’s influence on gender 
roles and the position of women in society). It has also been argued that fan fiction and fan 
remix works belong in this category and should be protected as transformative fair use. 
See generally David Tan, Harry Potter and the Transformation Wand: Fair Use, Canonicity 
and Fan Activity, in AMATEUR MEDIA: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 94 
(Dan Hunter et al. eds., 2012); Sonia Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of 
Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L., 461 (2006); Rachel L. 
Stroude, Complimentary Creation: Protecting Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 14 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 191 (2010). 
100 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 
2006) (finding that the use of promotional posters in a rock biography was a purpose 
separate and distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for which the 
images were created, and was transformative). There is arguably an overlap between 
categories (c) and (d). Courts have yet to decide if appropriation art, in particular Sherrie 
Levine’s rephotographs—where there is no modification to the original photograph, but 
there is a transformation in meaning between the original and the secondary work that 
may be reasonably perceived by the audience—qualify as transformative use. See generally 
JOHANNA BURTON & ELISABETH SUSSMAN, SHERRIE LEVINE: MAYHEM (2012); HOWARD 
SINGERMAN, ART HISTORY, AFTER SHERRIE LEVINE (Stephanie Fay et al. eds. 2011). 
101 This category overlaps with the next one. The courts usually focus on whether there 
was a change in purpose and whether there was significant public benefit to be gained 
from the secondary infringing use. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the automated processing and display of thumbnails of 
copyrighted photos as part of a visual search engine was a change in purpose and 
transformative); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that, 
despite the fact that Arriba made exact replications of Kelly’s images, the thumbnails 
served an entirely different function than Kelly’s original images and the use of the 
images in the search engine was transformative); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR 
Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that, even though the overall 
secondary work was found not to be consistently transformative, by “condensing, 
synthesizing, and reorganizing the preexisting material in an A-to-Z reference guide, the 
Lexicon does not recast the material in another medium to retell the story of Harry Potter, 
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(5) Changing the purpose of the original work 
within a technological context and with 
significant social benefit.102 
The types of uses in categories (1) to (5) are not mutually ex-
clusive and they often overlap.103 For example, one may construe 
the secondary work, The Wind Done Gone, by Alice Randall as a 
change in character compared to Gone With The Wind (since it is a 
critical comment that sets out to “demystify [Gone With The Wind] 
and strip the romanticism from Mitchell’s specific account of this 
period of our history”104), but not as a change in purpose (since 
both are novels that entertain). Alternatively, one may perceive The 
Wind Done Gone as being educational in purpose (since it is “prin-
cipally and purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and 
destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology” of Gone With 
The Wind105), hence demonstrating a change in purpose. Indeed, 
the Eleventh Circuit intimated that categorization of a secondary 
                                                                                                                            
but instead gives the copyrighted material another purpose”). More recently, the Second 
Circuit has unanimously held that “the purpose of Google’s copying of the original 
copyrighted books is to make available significant information about those books, permitting 
a searcher to identify those that contain a word or term of interest, as well as those that do 
not include reference to it,” and the search function and snippet views were therefore 
transformative. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015). 
102 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (holding 
that the manufacturer of a videocassette recorder was not liable for copyright 
infringement in part because consumer time-shifting of broadcast television for later 
viewing was transformative and was fair use); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 
562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that the automated processing of the plaintiff 
students’ work in defendant’s plagiarism detection software was transformative); 
Recording Indus. Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (strongly suggesting that transferring music from compact disc to MP3 for 
personal use would be fair use). See also Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant 
Technology, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1607 (2009) (discussing the application of the fair use 
doctrine to automatic copying, data-processing, and other non-expressive uses). 
103 There have been several attempts to organize different fair uses into clusters or 
categories, but none of them have discovered or claimed to have discovered a 
comprehensive formula to explain or predict all fair use outcomes. See, e.g., Michael J. 
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004); 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
104 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001). 
105 Id. 
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work is not important for fair use analysis, and the focus ought to 
be on whether there was a change in purpose or character.106 
The ascendancy of the transformative use doctrine, and in par-
ticular the modified Leval test embraced by the Second Circuit—
whether the secondary work may reasonably be perceived to have 
transformed the original in the creation of new information, new 
aesthetics, new insights and understandings—that is fast gaining 
acceptance in numerous other Circuit Courts, has attracted a fair 
share of criticisms.107 Matthew Bunker and Clay Calvert are espe-
cially concerned with how the Campbell court had, in a cursory 
manner, “turned the transformative use doctrine loose into copy-
right law, where it quickly became an enormously important, albeit 
undertheorized, component in lower court fair-use determina-
tions.”108 They observed that “the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that fair use, along with the separation of facts and ideas from 
expression, obviates the need for First Amendment scrutiny of 
copyright law by providing an internal statutory safeguard for free-
speech interests.”109 They also argued that this “doctrinal murki-
ness is particularly disturbing because fair use is a key proxy for 
free-expression interests in copyright law.”110 Bunker and Calvert 
identified three different ways in which courts since Campbell have 
conceptualized the transformative use doctrine—transformation as 
new insights, creative metamorphosis, and new purpose—and 
charged that not only are these multiple models of transformative-
ness incompatible, but they “create a disturbing First Amendment 
                                                                                                                            
106 Id. at 1274 n.27. Samuelson also argues that “makes little sense to organize the fair 
use caselaw around [categories]” and that one should focus on the three main underlying 
policies of “promoting free speech and expression interests of subsequent authors and the 
public, the ongoing progress of authorship, and learning.” Samuelson, supra note 103, at 
2544. 
107 See, e.g., Thomas Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 701 (2010); Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or 
Burn-out of Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence?, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 321 (2014); Kathleen K. Olson, Transforming Fair Use Online: The 
Ninth Circuit’s Productive-Use Analysis of Visual Search Engines, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 153 
(2009); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 
25 LAW & LITERATURE 20 (2013). 
108 Bunker & Calvert, supra note 59, at 94–95. 
109 Id. at 95. 
110 Id. 
336 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:311 
 
chilling effect.”111 To the contrary, this Article argues that the ris-
ing prominence of the transformative use doctrine in copyright law 
today represents an inconscient drift into the territory of defini-
tional balancing firmly in favor of First Amendment ideals, and the 
preponderance of decisions in recent years—finding transforma-
tiveness and fair use in cases involving satire and appropriation 
art—are very much protective of expressive interests. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COPYRIGHT 
It has been noted by free speech scholar Rodney Smolla that 
“[c]ontemporary free speech doctrines are extraordinarily detailed 
and often confusing” and that “[m]odern First Amendment law 
abounds in three-part and four-part tests of various kinds.”112 Simi-
larly, Lillian BeVier expressed despair at how “First Amendment 
theories have multiplied, the case law has become ever more chao-
tic, and consensus on fundamental issues has remained elusive 
both on and off the Court,”113 and Thomas McCarthy pointed out 
that the rules are “often maddeningly vague and unpredictable.”114 
While it is not the purpose of this Article to propose a systematic 
reconciliation or reconstruction of the contentious doctrines and 
rules of the First Amendment, this Part argues that an instrumental 
understanding of the First Amendment is critical to a more 
                                                                                                                            
111 Id. at 126. This categorization is arguably accurate as the courts, in particular the 
Second Circuit, have used different formulations for different fact scenarios. Where 
appropriation art is concerned, like in Cariou v. Prince and Seltzer v. Green Day, the “new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” test is used. In other 
scenarios, for instance where search engines are involved, the courts look for a “different 
purpose.” See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Authors Guild, Inc., v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). However, it has also been 
argued that behavioral studies suggest that clearer rules can induce even greater chilling 
effects. See Edmund T. Wang, The Line Between Copyright and the First Amendment and 
Why Its Vagueness May Further Speech Interests, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW. 1471, 1484–98 
(2011). 
112 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2:13 (3d ed. 2008); see also Robert C. 
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
2353, 2355 (2000). 
113 Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the 
Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1280 (2005). 
114 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:9 (2d ed. 
2015). 
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nuanced interpretation of the modified Leval test of transformative 
use as presently applied in copyright law. 
A. Goals and Theories of the First Amendment 
Courts are generally concerned that the enforcement of private 
rights, including intellectual property rights, does not have a “chill-
ing effect”115 on free speech. While earlier commentator writings 
have identified four separate values served by the First Amend-
ment’s protection of speech,116 more recent scholarship has nar-
rowed the theories for the First Amendment to three distinct yet 
interdependent goals: sponsoring enlightenment or the discovery of 
truth, self-fulfillment, and citizen participation in a deliberative 
democracy.117 There are numerous writings by political philoso-
phers and jurists advocating the protection of free speech prin-
ciples, but this Article will not be revisiting the arguments by theor-
ists such as John Stuart Mill, Alexander Meiklejohn, Thomas 
Emerson, and Ronald Dworkin.118 Instead this Section will focus 
                                                                                                                            
115 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); see also ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 38 (2d ed. 2005); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ENQUIRY 80–85 (1982). The term “free speech” shall be taken to mean the freedom of 
speech and of the press as protected by the First Amendment. It is well-accepted that “in 
modern First Amendment jurisprudence the Press Clause has largely been subsumed into 
the Speech Clause.” SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, §§ 22:6, 22:10, 22:18. 
116 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) ((1) 
“[A]ssuring individual self-fulfillment”; (2) “[A]dvancing knowledge and discovering 
truth”; (3) “[P]rovid[ing] for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society”; 
and (4) “[A]chieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community . . . 
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.”). 
117 Rodney Smolla argues that all three theories should be understood “not as mutually 
exclusive defenses of freedom of speech, but rather as mutually supportive rationales.” 
SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:7. See also BARENDT, supra note 115, at 7–21; 
MCCARTHY, supra note 114, §§ 8:2–8:8; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN 
SOCIETY 14–17 (1992). There have been different variations of the goals advanced by the 
First Amendment, but they cover essentially the same themes. See Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). 
118 For an excellent review of such works, see BARENDT, supra note 115, at 1–36; 
SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 35–46. See also RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 
(1996); THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(1966); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (John Gray 
ed., 1998). 
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only on how the First Amendment is traditionally viewed as essen-
tial for the protection of speech from governmental regulation, and 
how the courts have determined a hierarchy of different types of 
speech with the highest protection accorded to political speech and 
a lower level of protection for commercial speech. 
1. Discovery of Truth/Marketplace of Ideas 
There is a wealth of literature on the truth-seeking function and 
the marketplace of ideas, and this Article will not seek to reconcile 
differing versions of it, but will only highlight the fundamental te-
nets and their relevance to copyright law. In its earlier conceptions, 
the First Amendment goal of enlightenment or the discovery of 
truth is represented most prominently by Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 
theory of a “marketplace of ideas” expressed most forcefully in 
Abrams v. United States: 
But when men have realized that time has upset 
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even 
more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution.119 
The marketplace theory is perhaps “the most famous and rhe-
torically resonant of all free speech theories,”120 but it also exhibits 
a strong underlying democratic theory, evident in the oft-quoted 
phrase from New York Times v. Sullivan that there is a “profound 
national commitment” to the principle that “debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”121 However, 
the First Amendment case law offers an important lesson: the Su-
                                                                                                                            
119 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375. 
120 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:4. 
121 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 
U.S. 312, 318 (1988); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). The 
democratic variant of the marketplace of ideas theory was first discussed in Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96, 101–12 (1940). 
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preme Court’s discussion of the relationship between truth, know-
ledge, and the First Amendment has been inconsistent. The Court 
sometimes posits that the discovery of truth within the marketplace 
of ideas is a vital justification for the First Amendment. At other 
times, however, it subordinates that rationale to other concerns, 
such as democratic legitimacy. It is worth noting that the truth-
seeking justification, and its accompanying marketplace of ideas 
metaphor, have become far less influential in contemporary free 
speech scholarship, and “the free speech literature appears increa-
singly to have detached itself from the empirical and instrumental 
epistemic arguments made by Mill and others, focusing instead on 
the other justifications . . . such as arguments from democracy or 
autonomy.”122 
This “marketplace” model features most prominently in sce-
narios where state action is challenged, and is the cornerstone of 
the content discrimination doctrine that subjects governmental acts 
to judicial strict scrutiny.123 It mandates that speakers should be 
free from government control or censorship, so that truth and 
falsehood may battle it out in public discourse. In Texas v. Johnson, 
the Supreme Court, in the plurality opinion, reiterated that “[i]f 
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is 
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreea-
                                                                                                                            
122 Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 
453 (2012) (referring to Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 897, 909–10 (2010)). 
123 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (citing Ashcroft 
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)) (“As a general matter, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech 
because of its content will ever be permissible.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
387 (1992) (content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”). The Supreme Court 
has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of or that have the effect of 
restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment. 
On the other hand, so-called “content-neutral” time, place, and manner restrictions are 
acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and 
do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. See Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647–48 (1981). 
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ble.”124 The value of literature or the arts in the marketplace of 
ideas stems from its persuasive or analytic capabilities with respect 
to a particular idea or point of view, and the protection of expres-
sion is often limited to the audience’s ability to understand or as-
similate the underlying idea.125 
In terms of its potential relevance to copyright law, the market-
place of ideas doctrine is usually more compatible with protection 
of visual expression that privileges political art, but the Supreme 
Court in Hurley importantly suggests that no particularized mes-
sage, let alone a political one, is required for protection. Further-
more, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, an original exponent of the 
marketplace theory, remarked, “the people do not need novels or 
dramas or paintings or poems, because they will be called upon to 
vote.”126 
2. Self-fulfillment Function/Individual Autonomy 
In contrast, the self-fulfillment function or individual autonomy 
rationale shifts the attention from the ideas marketplace to individ-
ual dignity.127 While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“the human spirit . . . demands self-expression,”128 there have 
been relatively few decisions discussing this as a central goal of the 
First Amendment.129 This theory would potentially afford greater 
                                                                                                                            
124 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). It is noted that “[e]very idea, no matter 
how misguided, and every speaker, no matter how ill-equipped, stands on equal footing.” 
Horwitz, supra note 122, at 471. 
125 Genevieve Blake, Expressive Merchandise and the First Amendment in Public Fora, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1049, 1059 (2007). 
126 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
263; Blake, supra note 125, at 1059. 
127 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 5 UCLA L. 
REV. 964, 990–91 (1978); Blake, supra note 125, at 1081–83; David A.J. Richards, Free 
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
128 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974). 
129 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 
(1969). For a useful discussion of this theory of the First Amendment, see Brian C. 
Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998). 
There has also been much criticism that individual self-actualization or autonomy cannot 
provide a sound basis for the First Amendment. See Patrick M. Garry, The First 
Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a Constitutional Model that Focuses on the 
Existence of Alternative Channels of Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 514 (2007); 
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First Amendment protection to secondary expressive works that 
may reasonably be perceived to have created new information, aes-
thetics, insights, and understandings because it would eliminate the 
need for a particularized analysis of the author’s message, focusing 
instead on the function of the expression with regard to the au-
thor’s assertion of self in cultural space or other “extrarational val-
ue[s].”130 Nevertheless, it has been argued that although this 
theory might regard a right to express personal beliefs and political 
attitudes as a reflection of what it means to be human, the exercise 
of free speech might also be of value to democracy in “leading to 
the development of more reflective and mature individuals and so 
benefitting society as a whole.”131 
3. Participatory Democracy & Distrust of Government 
The Supreme Court has more recently embraced a “participa-
tory theory of democracy”132 that is concerned with the enlighten-
ment of public decisionmaking in a democracy through enabling 
public access to information and promoting public discourse.133 In 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief Justice Roberts, 
delivering the plurality opinion, commented: 
The First Amendment “is designed and in-
tended to remove governmental restraints from the 
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to 
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of 
each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach 
                                                                                                                            
Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First 
Amendment Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19 (1990). 
130 Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 110 (1996); Martin H. Redish, 
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 604 (1982). 
131 Tom Campbell, Rationales for Freedom of Communication, in FREEDOM OF 
COMMUNICATION 33–34 (Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994); see also 
BARENDT, supra note 115, at 13. 
132 See Post, supra note 112, at 2371; see also BARENDT, supra note 115, at 18–21; 
DWORKIN, supra note 118, at 15–26. Smolla refers to this as the “democratic self-
governance” rationale. SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:28. 
133 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 
(1988); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); 
see also King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005); Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rowlee, 899 
F.2d 1275, 1278 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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would comport with the premise of individual digni-
ty and choice upon which our political system 
rests.” . . . . [It] safeguards an individual’s right to 
participate in the public debate . . . .134 
This theory of participatory democracy has been viewed as 
drawing on elements of the other two theories: that the minorities 
in a representative democracy have the right to contribute to politi-
cal debate as they may have better ideas than the majority, and that 
the right of individuals to dignity and self-fulfillment may be ex-
pressed through their engagement in public discourse. It has also 
been called the “most important theoretical approach to freedom 
of speech in the twentieth century.”135 Often known as the Madi-
sonian ideal of deliberative democracy, different but related ver-
sions of this theory have been prominently championed by consti-
tutional scholars like Robert Post,136 Cass Sunstein,137 and Jack Bal-
kin.138 Post believes that democratic self-government is the primary 
end of the First Amendment, arguing “[i]t is plain that within pub-
lic discourse the value of democratic legitimation enjoys lexical 
priority.”139 
                                                                                                                            
134 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014) (quoting 
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24). 
135 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2004). 
136 See Post, supra note 112; Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy 
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Robert C. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) [hereinafter Post, 
Constitutional Concept]. 
137 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17–23, 241–
52 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 6–9, 96–101, 239–43 (2001). 
138 Balkin argues that the purpose of free speech is to promote a “democratic culture” 
that is even broader than deliberation about public issues such that each individual has “a 
fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in the development of the ideas 
and meanings that constitute them and the communities and subcommunities to which 
they belong.” Balkin, supra note 135, at 4; see also Jack M. Balkin, Populism and 
Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1948–49 (1995). 
139 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 34 (2012). 
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The participatory theory is also supported by the more philo-
sophical writings of Meiklejohn,140 Dworkin,141 and Owen Fiss.142 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled that to qualify for the 
highest levels of constitutional protection speech must relate to 
self-government,143 Justice Stephen Breyer, speaking in an extra-
judicial capacity, has advocated an approach to constitutional adju-
dication centred on “active liberty” similar to Post’s participatory 
theory.144 An acceptance of the participatory theory has important 
implications for the continuing development of the transformative 
use doctrine in resolving the tension between free speech values 
and property rights when arguing fair use in a copyright infringe-
ment claim as it focuses on not an abstract notion of the quest for 
truth, but on how the nature and content of communication can 
“ensure that the individual can effectively participate in and con-
tribute to our republican system of self-government”145 where “na-
tional identity [is understood] to be endlessly controversial.”146 
This democratic rationale of the First Amendment is usually in-
tertwined with a deep distrust of government. In United States v. 
Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts commented, “[t]he First Amend-
ment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. 
Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment 
simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”147 Similarly, 
in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice Scalia em-
phasized that “esthetic and moral judgments about art and litera-
ture . . . are for the individual to make, not for the Government to 
                                                                                                                            
140 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 19–28 (1965). 
141 See DWORKIN, supra note 118, at 15–26. 
142 See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409–10 
(1986). 
143 Garry, supra note 129, at 519; see also SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 112, § 2:46. 
144 Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2002). 
The participatory theory also appears to have the support of Brian Murchison who, 
through an analysis of judgments of the Supreme Court, contends that the “self-
governance value” underpins the First Amendment. See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and 
the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1251, 1291 (2006). 
145 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). 
146 Post, supra note 112, at 2369; see also BARENDT, supra note 115, at 48–49. 
147 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
344 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:311 
 
decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.”148 The 
Supreme Court has never made an “official choice” among com-
peting theories.149 But “where the doctrinal implications of differ-
ent prominent theories . . . collide, courts will tend to give priority 
to the participatory theory of democracy.”150 The implication is 
that an infringing work that contains some form of political speech 
that advances democratic debate should warrant heightened First 
Amendment protection, and this status should be acknowledged 
when evaluating the fair use defense. 
B. Infringing Works Can Also Be Expressive Works 
While this Section does not cover all the different kinds of 
transformative uses, it will attempt to show that in at least three 
categories of transformative uses—(1) to (3) as identified in Part 
I—First Amendment considerations are important in guiding the 
evaluation of transformative use to ensure that the end-result ad-
vances not only the goals of the Copyright Clause, but also those of 
the Free Speech Clause.151 Such uses tend to comment on or 
present a different way of viewing familiar iconography, societal 
archetypes, public obsessions, and majoritarian beliefs, and, as 
such, they fall within the First Amendment categories of protected 
speech, such as political speech, art, entertainment, and matters of 
public interest. 
                                                                                                                            
148 Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011); see also Playboy 
Entm’t Grp, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
149 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1996). 
150 Post, supra note 112, at 2371; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a 
Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 577–78 (1999). According to Frederick 
Schauer, the “narrowness of the argument from democracy is also its greatest 
strength . . . it does furnish several strong reasons for giving special attention and 
protection to political speech.” SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 44. It is noted that the 
opposition to the participatory theory comes most strongly from those who argue from a 
position of individual autonomy. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty and Free Speech, 70 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997); David Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy and Freedom of 
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354–55 (1991). 
151 It should be noted that Rebecca Tushnet has previously presented a complementary 
analysis of how copying often has substantial speech value, and how pervasive copying 
may be necessary to convey a persuasive message or to participate in a group’s activities. 
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and Copying 
Saves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
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A parody must invoke or copy a significant proportion of the 
original copyrighted work in order for the parody to be effective; it 
will invariably satisfy the substantial similarity test for copyright 
infringement. The question that follows is whether the parody can 
nevertheless claim to be fair use. Parody enjoys an exalted pro-
tected status in intellectual property jurisprudence. The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals described parody as “a humorous form of 
social commentary and literary criticism . . . [that] seeks to ridicule 
sacred verities and prevailing mores,”152 thus implicating First 
Amendment concerns. The Second Circuit noted “the broad scope 
permitted parody in First Amendment Law,”153 and that “in to-
day’s world of unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hos-
pitable to the humor of parody.”154 In a more rigorous examination 
of the First Amendment’s influence on the fair use defense, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has more overtly considered the 
status of parody under the Free Speech Clause in Mattel v. Walking 
Mountain Productions.155 The court was of the view that parody has 
“socially significant value as free speech under the First Amend-
ment.”156 More importantly, the court ruled that while individuals 
may disagree on the success or extent of a parody, parodic ele-
ments that may “reasonably be perceived” in a work will often jus-
tify fair use protection.157 Parody may thus be seen as contributing 
valuable commentary and criticism to the marketplace of ideas, or 
advancing democratic debate on matters of public interest through 
the use of irreverent humor. 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of 
protecting parody as fair use, but did not explicitly refer to the First 
Amendment. Justice Souter merely asserted that “parody has an 
obvious claim to transformative value.”158 In Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, where Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine alleging that 
the publisher had intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him 
                                                                                                                            
152 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987). 
153 Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 319 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982). 
154 Elsmere Music v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980). 
155 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 
156 Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 
(9th Cir. 1997)). 
157 Id. 
158 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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through a parody advertisement depicting him as drunk, immoral, 
and hypocritical, the Supreme Court reiterated that: 
At the heart of the First Amendment is the rec-
ognition of the fundamental importance of the free 
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public in-
terest and concern. “[T]he freedom to speak one’s 
mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and 
thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the 
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as 
a whole.”159 
Although the case concerned offensive political cartoons and 
vulgar caricatures of public figures, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s con-
cerns about stifling political discourse comports with prevailing 
judicial sentiments about the importance of parody (defined broad-
ly).160 
While the critical message in a parody that comments directly 
on the original work or its author can be easily discerned, the ideas 
expressed in other forms of artistic works may be more obtuse. The 
famous comment by the Supreme Court in Hurley that “a narrow, 
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional 
protection”161 appears to have been implicitly subsumed within the 
modified Leval test—whether the secondary work may reasonably be 
perceived to have transformed the original in the creation of new infor-
mation, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—that pre-
sently holds sway over the Second and Ninth Circuits. This broad-
er approach to transformative use allows for uses of the original 
work that do not comment on the original or may not even have a 
critical bearing on the original, so long as the original has been used 
in the creation of something new. From the perspective of the First 
Amendment, this new creation inevitably adds to the marketplace 
of ideas, and certain situations can stimulate political discourse or 
discussion of public issues. The protection of speech—which gen-
                                                                                                                            
159 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)). 
160 Id. at 51–55. 
161 Hurley v. Irish-Am., Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
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erally includes symbolic or expressive conduct162—by the First 
Amendment depends on its position in a hierarchy of protectable 
speech, the applicable level of scrutiny of the governmental action, 
and the nature of the other rights it is in conflict with.163 However, 
the Supreme Court has not established “a clear theory to explain 
why and when speech qualifies for the top tier,”164 with the plurali-
ty opinion in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders conceding that 
the inquiry “must be determined by [the expression’s] content, 
form and context.”165 In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Associa-
tion, Justice Scalia, delivering the majority judgment, emphasized: 
The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect 
discourse on public matters, but we have long rec-
ognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from 
entertainment, and dangerous to try. “Everyone is 
familiar with instances of propaganda through fic-
tion. What is one man’s amusement, teaches anoth-
er’s doctrine.”166 
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, Justice Souter 
commented that the “constitutional protection of artistic works 
turns not on the political significance that may be attributable to 
such productions, though they may indeed comment on the politi-
cal, but simply on their expressive character, which falls within a 
spectrum of protected ‘speech’ extending outward from the core 
of overtly political declarations.”167 From the First Amendment 
perspective, art has the potential to “affect public attitudes and 
behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a po-
litical or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which cha-
racterizes all artistic expression.”168 Hence, when appropriation art 
                                                                                                                            
162 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (cross-burning); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–06 (1989) (flag-burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (wearing black armbands); Ayres v. City of Chicago, 
125 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997) (wearing t-shirts). 
163 BARENDT, supra note 115, at 75; see also SCHAUER, supra note 115, at 89–92; William 
Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982). 
164 SUNSTEIN, PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 137, at 11. 
165 Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). 
166 Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)). 
167 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998). 
168 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
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is found to infringe the copyright in an original antecedent work 
that is used as a referential device, there is a clash of two sets of 
expressive interests. The attempt to resolve this conflict through a 
simplistic invocation of the transformative use doctrine in the fair 
use defense—as evident in Blanch v. Koons and Cariou v. Prince—
sidesteps the important First Amendment considerations of 
whether the secondary artistic use espouses a particular political 
viewpoint or a different social shaping of thought that would allow 
it to trump the right of the original author. 
Appropriation art, as a genre of contemporary art, is often an 
ideological critique that takes or hijacks “dominant words and im-
ages to create insubordinate, counter messages.”169 Appropriation 
art has been defined as “[t]he practice or technique of reworking 
the images or styles contained in earlier works of art, esp[ecially] 
(in later use) in order to provoke critical re-evaluation of well-
known pieces by presenting them in new contexts, or to challenge 
notions of individual creativity or authenticity in art.”170 It is iden-
tified closely with the practice of “recoding” or “a shift in mean-
ing” which occurs purely due to the fact that an original word, im-
age, or object has been appropriated.171 The Second Circuit recog-
nized the genre of appropriation art as a “tradition [which] defines 
its efforts as follows: when the artist finishes his work, the meaning 
of the original object has been extracted and an entirely new mean-
ing set in its place. An example is Andy Warhol’s reproduction of 
multiple images of Campbell’s soup cans.”172 
In Rogers v. Koons (“Koons I”), although the Second Circuit 
thought that Jeff Koons’ earlier work of a stainless steel casting of 
an inflatable rabbit holding a carrot belonged to this genre,173 it 
found Koons’ sculpture, String of Puppies, which was based on Art 
Rogers’ photograph, Puppies, displayed at an art gallery, to be in-
                                                                                                                            
169 David Evans, Introduction: Seven Types of Appropriation, in APPROPRIATION 12, 13 
(2009); see also E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for 
Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (1993). 
170 Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 220 (2007). 
171 Isabelle Graw, Fascination, Subversion and Dispossession in Appropriation Art, in 
APPROPRIATION, supra note 169, at 214. 
172 Koons I, 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992). 
173 Id. 
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sufficiently transformative and hence infringing the copyright in 
the original photograph Puppies on which the sculpture was based. 
True to the tradition of appropriation art, there must exist a signifi-
cant degree of exact reproduction of the original object (i.e, War-
hol’s reverential treatment of the Campbell’s soup cans) in order 
for the artist to convey his or her comment or criticism of a particu-
lar cultural or social phenomenon. It may be just a subtle shift in 
context, medium, motif or style which delivers that postmodern 
critique. In Koons I, it is arguable that Koons did just that. He 
wanted every feature of the photograph by Art Rogers of a typical 
American scene—a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of 
eight charming puppies—copied faithfully in the sculpture.174 The 
minutiae of Koons’ craft itself is a critical commentary of the meti-
culous obsession of the media with, and the general interest of the 
public in, banality. The court accepted Koons’ argument that he 
had drawn upon “the artistic movements of Cubism and Dadaism, 
with particular influence attributed to Marcel Duchamp, who in 
1913 became the first to incorporate manufactured objects (ready-
mades) into a work of art, directly influencing Koons’ work and the 
work of other contemporary American artists.”175 The court also 
agreed that Koons: 
[B]elongs to the school of American artists who be-
lieve the mass production of commodities and me-
dia images has caused a deterioration in the quality 
of society, and this artistic tradition of which he is a 
member proposes through incorporating these im-
ages into works of art to comment critically both on 
the incorporated object and the political and eco-
nomic system that created it.176 
But the Second Circuit’s issue with Koons was that he failed to 
comment critically on the original photograph that was incorpo-
rated into his work. Decided before the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision on fair use in Campbell in 1994, the court in Koons I found 
                                                                                                                            
174 Id. at 305, 307; see also Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 CIV. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993) (holding that Jeff Koons’ sculpture “Ushering in Banality,” 
based on Barbara Campbell’s photograph “Boys with Pig,” was not a fair use). 
175 Koons I, 960 F.2d at 311. 
176 Id. 
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against Koons, noting that “even given that String of Puppies is a 
satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern 
any parody of the photograph Puppies itself.”177 
However, post-Campbell, and fourteen years after Koons I was 
handed down, Jeff Koons was back before the Second Circuit 
again, but this time, the result was in his favor, despite the absence 
of parody. In Koons II, the court demonstrated a greater willingness 
to embrace appropriation art and its postmodernist technique of 
recontextualizing or repurposing objects and images in mainstream 
media or familiar to the public at large. The decision resonates with 
the Supreme Court’s willingness to protect artistic expression as 
demonstrated in Hurley and Finley, where the First Amendment 
was explicitly considered. Koons’ use of Andrea Blanch’s photo-
graph Silk Sandals by Gucci published in a fashion magazine for his 
collage Niagara—one of the artworks in the Easyfun-Ethereal series 
exhibited at the Deutsche Guggenheim Berlin—was held to be 
transformative.178 Koons did not intend to parody or comment on 
the original Blanch photograph; but he claimed that he created the 
painting to “comment on the ways in which some of our most basic 
appetites—for food, play and sex—are mediated by popular im-
ages.”179 He also intended to “compel the viewer to break out of 
the conventional way of experiencing a particular appetite as me-
diated by mass media,”180 and he used Blanch’s photograph be-
cause it represented “a particular type of woman frequently pre-
sented in advertising” and that this typicality “further[ed] his pur-
pose of commenting on the commercial images . . . in our consumer 
culture.”181 The Second Circuit applied the modified Leval test 
and found sufficient transformation to qualify Koons for the fair 
use defense. 
                                                                                                                            
177 Id. Relying on Koons I, the New York district court also found against Koons when 
United Feature Syndicate sued Koons for copyright infringement in his sculptural work 
“Wild Boy and Puppy” that featured the Odie cartoon dog character from the Garfield 
series. Judge Leisure did not even attempt to examine issues of parody, satire, or critical 
commentary, but simply cited Koons I as authority that the $125,000 sculptures were 
nothing but “high-priced art.” United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 
370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
178 Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 248 (internal citations omitted). 
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After Koons II, it is arguable that courts should focus instead on 
examining the appropriation artist’s “justification for the very act 
of borrowing”182 and the artist’s explanation of how “the use of an 
existing image advanced his artistic purposes.”183 This line of in-
quiry is very much aligned with the First Amendment ethos of 
promoting self-actualization and advancing the marketplace of 
ideas; it treats the secondary work not just as aesthetic art but also 
as critical commentary on matters of public concern.184 
In Cariou v. Prince, there is much similarity between Richard 
Prince’s and Koons’ intent in reproducing original photographs in 
order to successfully convey new meanings through repurposing 
preexisting works. The Second Circuit’s focus on “artistic pur-
pose” is consistent with the line of Supreme Court decisions that 
has affirmed that the First Amendment’s protection extends even 
to artistic expression that does not convey a “particularized mes-
sage.”185 Robert Kausnic hints at this postmodern turn in copyright 
law: 
Koons expressed the purpose of allowing the viewer 
to create the meaning from his or her own “personal 
experience with these objects, products, and images 
and at the same time gain new [and unspecified] in-
sight into how these affect our lives.” In a sense, 
Koons carefully refused to infuse particular meaning 
to the work, but rather empowered the viewer with 
establishing his or her own relative meaning.186 
Similarly, Peter Jaszi suggests that Koons II “may signal a gen-
eral loosening of authors’ and owners’ authority over, by now, not 
quite so auratic works, allowing greater space for the free play of 
meaning on the part of audience members and follow-up users who 
                                                                                                                            
182 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994); Koons II, 467 F.3d at 255. 
183 Koons II, 467 F.3d at 255. The court also cautioned that “Koons’s clear conception 
of his reasons for using ‘Silk Sandals,’ and his ability to articulate those reasons, ease our 
analysis in this case. We do not mean to suggest, however, that either is a sine qua non for 
a finding of fair use—as to satire or more generally.” Id. at 255 n.5. 
184 See Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2015). 
185 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
186 Robert Kausnic, The Problem of Meaning in Non-Discursive Expression, 57 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 399, 421 (2010). 
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bring new interpretations.”187 This kind of art—typical of the oeu-
vre of contemporary artists like Warhol, Koons, and Prince—has 
been termed “nonpropositional art” because it conveys “no single 
representation or message.”188 Randall Bezanson contends that 
such art yields “a message or meaning that is the creation not of 
the artist’s propositional intention but the viewer’s independent 
construction.”189 Referring to Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans and 
Prince’s Cowboys series, Benzanson argues that “their ‘message’ is 
their value as an instrument that unleashes the viewer’s own, per-
haps idiosyncratic, leap of imagination and perception.”190 But 
more importantly, even a visually non-transformative work may be 
contextually transformative because it has introduced new ideas 
fundamentally different from the original. Referring to Sherrie Le-
vine’s rephotographing of Walker Evans’ photographs in her series 
titled After Walker Evans, Emily Meyers argues that “[i]n this re-
gard, authorship is tantamount, for it infuses the appropriated or 
derivative work with vastly different significance. A derivative or 
appropriating use in this regard will never substitute for the origi-
nal.”191 Levine’s attempt has been lauded by art critics: 
Levine’s re-presentation of the Evans works as her 
own is an astute artistic strategy that questions not 
only the power relations inscribed in the action of 
the “master” photographer Evans but also the sub-
sequent art-historical canonization and market value 
of the original works. Property relations, patriarchal 
authority, authorship and originality are all brought 
under scrutiny.192 
Although the original image by Evans and the second by Levine 
may be indistinguishable from one another, “[t]he roles each plays 
in the history of art continuum are unique.”193 Evans’ image clearly 
                                                                                                                            
187 Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 105, 116 (2009). 
188 RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 280 (2009). 
189 Id. at 280. 
190 Id. at 285. 
191 Meyers, supra note 170, at 239. 
192 Polly Staple, Switzerland, FRIEZE MAG. (June–Aug. 2008), http://www.frieze.com/
issue/article/switzerland/ [http://perma.cc/F8CG-Z74F]. 
193 Meyers, supra note 170, at 239. 
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has a different purpose and character from Levine’s.194 Indeed, 
“[w]hether the creator of a transformative work is an unsuccessful 
artist on a shoestring budget like Forsythe or a hugely successful 
public figure with funding from Deustche Bank and the Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Foundation like Koons, fair use allows artists to fur-
ther the generation of new meaning through repurposing preexist-
ing works.”195 One does not need to like what Richard Prince does, 
but it is quintessential not only to the progress of the arts196 but also 
to the marketplace of ideas that one has the opportunity to learn 
about and discuss the diversity of styles and perspectives. Guggen-
heim art curator Nancy Spector commented, “Prince’s appropria-
tions of existing photographs are never merely copies of the already 
available. Instead, they extract a kind of photographic uncons-
ciousness form the image, bringing to the fore suppressed truths 
about its meaning and its making.”197 
III. REDISCOVERING THE LOST FIRST AMENDMENT 
WITHIN TRANSFORMATIVE USE 
A. Copyright and the Issue of Its First Amendment Immunity 
Copyright law as enshrined in the Copyright Act is viewpoint 
neutral and generally applies on its face to all individuals and firms 
regardless of their identity and ideology, and regardless of the con-
tent of the speech. While the copyright statute does not target the 
use of another’s copyrighted work to advocate or oppose war, gay 
marriage, abortion rights, drug use, pornography, gun control, and 
governmental policies, it clearly abridges speech through the impo-
sition of civil liability for an unauthorized use of a work protected 
under copyright law. 
                                                                                                                            
194 Art historians have highlighted “the political and feminist underpinnings of the 
exclusively masculine works by seminal male artists Levine chose to appropriate.” 
Meyers, supra note 170, at 224; see also Sherrie Levine, After Walker Evans 2 (1981), 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/1995.266.2 [http://perma.cc/R25Y-
EVMH]. 
195 Matt Williams, Silence and Postmodern Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 
70 (2011). 
196 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
197 NANCY SPECTOR, RICHARD PRINCE 26 (2007). 
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The Supreme Court has highlighted that while freedom of 
speech has been recognized “as indispensable to a free society and 
its government . . . [it] has not meant that the public interest in free 
speech . . . always has prevailed over competing interests of the 
public.”198 Most existing First Amendment jurisprudence is con-
cerned with governmental action that abridges speech,199 with less 
attention given to discussing how private action can also signifi-
cantly restrict speech.200 In the area of intellectual property, par-
ticularly copyright and trademark laws, instead of subjecting the 
relevant legislation to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, courts 
have traditionally preferred to “accommodate” First Amendment 
interests within existing intellectual property doctrine. For exam-
ple, the twin rulings of the Supreme Court in Eldred and Golan 
have steadfastly refused to consider separate First Amendment ar-
guments outside the internal structures of copyright law, namely 
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.201 In trademark law, 
courts have denied First Amendment protections to advertisers 
who violate section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, reasoning that such 
                                                                                                                            
198 Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979). Regarding the protection of 
private property as a competing interest, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74, 82–88 (1980) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1972). 
199 The Supreme Court has employed a “heightened scrutiny methodology” drawn 
from the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence where governmental regulation has to 
satisfy the relevant strict, intermediate, or rational scrutiny standards, depending on 
whether it was content-neutral or content-based. Content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restrictions are usually permitted if they serve a substantial governmental 
interest, but content-based restriction of protectable speech will be subject to strict 
scrutiny, which is usually fatal to the challenged regulation. See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra 
note 112, §§ 2:12, 3:1–3:2; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 817 (2000); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874–79 (1997); R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment 
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Susan Williams, Content Discrimination and the 
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991). 
200 On the impact of the enforcement of private intellectual property rights on the public 
domain, see generally, Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private 
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part II, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191 
(1994); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1993). 
201 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
219 (2003). Rebecca Tushnet has criticized this approach, see supra note 151, at 590 
(“Denied a presence in the main body of copyright law, the First Amendment returns as 
fair use. This back-door approach has several troublesome effects.”). 
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laws pose no constitutional problems because they regulate only 
false and misleading commercial speech; the likelihood of confu-
sion test and the artistic relevance defense readily shield expressive 
uses like parody from liability.202 Even for trademark dilution 
claims, the First Amendment operates through broadly crafted sta-
tutory defenses like the non-commercial exception and the parody 
defense.203 
According to Melville Nimmer, courts applying the method of 
“definitional balancing” weigh the objectives and policy considera-
tions that underlie the speech-burdening legal doctrine against 
those that underlie the First Amendment in order to set out gener-
ally applicable definitional rules governing which forms of speech 
the legal doctrine in question may constitutionally burden and 
which it may not.204 Although courts today are employing the con-
tent-based/content-neutral distinction—with the consequent ap-
plication of a strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny standard—
when evaluating government action that abridges the freedom of 
                                                                                                                            
202 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 263 
(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys is an obvious parody of “Louis 
Vuitton” handbags and on balance, does not cause confusion); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 
F.3d 309, 314–15 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the “likelihood-of-confusion test [for 
trademark infringement] generally strikes a comfortable balance between the First 
Amendment and the rights of [trade]mark holders” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that the 
likelihood of confusion test generally strikes a comfortable balance between the trademark 
owner’s property rights and First Amendment interests); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (prohibiting application of the Lanham Act to titles of artistic 
works unless the title “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever or, if it 
has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the 
content of the work”); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486–
87 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding the use of “Lardashe” jeans for larger women to be a 
successful and permissible parody of “Jordache” jeans); L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers, 
Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (“It offends the Constitution, however, to invoke the 
anti-dilution statute as a basis for enjoining the noncommercial use of a trademark by a 
defendant engaged in a protected form of expression”). 
203 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); see also Bosley Med. 
Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677–80 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s 
use of a trademark in the name and content of its website to criticize the trademark holder 
is a noncommercial use protected by the First Amendment). 
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speech,205 there remain important areas of private causes of action 
where this definitional balancing is applied. Examples of this defini-
tional balancing are evident in the “actual malice” rule in the laws 
of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress206 and 
the definition of “obscenity” in exclusionary categories of speech 
falling fully outside the protection of the First Amendment.207 
Nimmer has argued previously that copyright law already contains 
a de facto definitional balance, located in the idea/expression di-
chotomy and fair use.208 
Although the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Eldred 
commented that not all copyright laws are “categorically immune” 
from First Amendment challenges,209 the essential thrust of Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion is that “[as long as] Congress has not altered 
the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”210 In Golan, Justice Gins-
burg again delivered the opinion of the Court and reaffirmed the 
holding in Eldred, noting that “some restriction on expression is 
the inherent and intended effect of every grant of copyright,”211 but 
there was no necessity for heightened scrutiny if Congress has not 
interfered with the built-in First Amendment accommodations—
mainly the idea/expression distinction and fair use defense—
embraced by copyright law.212 David Lange and Jefferson Powell 
argue that what Justice Ginsburg and the majority see as speech-
protective safeguards “make no sense as a justification for in-
fringement of free expression under the First Amendment.”213 As 
                                                                                                                            
205 See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231 (2012); 
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it stands today, “copyright law inverts the ordinary presumptions 
of First Amendment analysis . . . . In the world of Eldred, it is the 
intrusion of the First Amendment into a vast regulatory scheme 
against which the Court must be on guard, not the government’s 
invasion of the domain of free expression.”214 
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg’s passing comment that “fair use 
defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship and com-
ment, . . . even for parody”215 suggests rather flippantly that the 
much revered First Amendment merits even no further internal 
examination when it clashes with copyright. Is the fair use defense 
sufficiently robust to accommodate the different speech-protective 
rationales of, and the different hierarchies of, speech recognized by 
the First Amendment? The deafening silence of any reference to 
the First Amendment is startling in judicial fair use analysis, espe-
cially when the transformative use doctrine provides the most ap-
propriate entry point for discussing whether recognizing an infring-
ing use as “transformative”—and ultimately fair—properly bal-
ances the goals of copyright as an “engine of free expression” and 
“to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for 
their labors.”216 
Lange and Powell lament over “intellectual property’s increas-
ing dominance over expression”217 and disparagingly point out that 
“it is copyright against the First Amendment in a game the First 
Amendment is slated to lose.”218 This Article disagrees with such 
an apocalyptic view of the influence of the First Amendment on 
intellectual property laws, and argues, to the contrary, that the spi-
rit of the First Amendment has in fact been guiding the rise of the 
transformative use doctrine in the copyright fair use defense. In 
order to better understand the covert operation of the First 
Amendment within the strictures of copyright law—as well as in 
trademark law—one must first appreciate how copyrighted works, 
like trademarks, can function as semiotic signs which are encoded 
                                                                                                                            
214 Id. at 123. 
215 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003)). 
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558 (1985)). 
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with specific meanings or viewpoints either ascribed to them by the 
original author or by the public. 
When an infringer uses these copyrighted works to express a 
different viewpoint, or to comment or criticize the original work or 
the author, such a use, in copyright parlance, may signify a change 
in purpose or character of the original work.219 Alternatively, in the 
words of Leval, the original work has been “transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and un-
derstandings.”220 If one were to deconstruct this doctrine through 
the lens of the First Amendment, the transformative use test clear-
ly advances the marketplace of ideas and the democratic rationale 
through the creation of “new information” and “new insights and 
understandings,” as well as the self-fulfillment function through 
the creation of “new aesthetics.”221 In view of the contemporary 
cultural significance of many well-known copyrighted works, this 
Article urges a consideration of copyrighted works as semiotic 
signs in order to comprehend how courts have already embarked 
on a covert First Amendment rescue to ensure that copyright ac-
commodates itself to the freedom of speech rather than the re-
verse. 
B. The “Work” as a Semiotic Sign 
Copyright law is often premised on the identification of an au-
thor of a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work, and then giv-
ing this author monopoly rights for a limited period to control the 
commercial exploitation of his or her intellectual creation. Howev-
er, the hegemonic position of the authorial text has been challenged 
by scholars like Roland Barthes, who argues that “a text’s unity lies 
not in its origin but in its destination” and that “the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”222 Barthes’ 
work, controversial at the time of publication with its assault on 
                                                                                                                            
219 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
220 Leval, supra note 28, at 1111. 
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modernity and the primacy of authorial control, has nonetheless 
laid the groundwork for an important body of scholarship on inter-
pretive communities. Interdisciplinary legal writings, especially in 
the area of intellectual property and personality rights, have also 
actively engaged such themes in recent years.223 For example, Na-
thaniel Noda contends that copyright law ought to “keep pace with 
changing times and practices by recognizing that an author impli-
citly cedes certain interpretive rights to the general public when he 
or she introduces a work into the stream of public discourse.”224 
Contemporary cultural studies are concerned with the practices 
of popular culture, the relationships between audiences and pro-
ducers, the formation of identity, and the nature of consumption. 
In particular, the application of semiotics to assist the development 
of intellectual property laws relating to logos, images, and literary 
works has received significant scholarly attention. For example, 
Barton Beebe, in his seminal works on a semiotic account of trade-
mark doctrine,225 has persuasively demonstrated that “semiotic 
concepts can be applied to clarify and ameliorate fundamental areas 
of trademark doctrine and policy.”226 His analysis of “sign value” 
as a “Saussurean structural value” that involves a “conspicuous 
display of distinctions, of ‘marginal differences’”227 has a parallel 
relevance to well-known literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic 
works. I have also investigated the influence of semiotics on the 
laws relating to famous marks, and the commercial appropriation of 
the celebrity personality in the right of publicity.228 
                                                                                                                            
223 See Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 
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224 Nathaniel T. Noda, Copyright Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and 
Justify Fan-Based Activities, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 987, 991 (2010). 
225 See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Account of Trademark Doctrine and Trademark 
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(2004). 
226 Beebe, Semiotic Account, supra note 225, at 42. 
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Umberto Eco describes semiotics as a social science discipline 
that studies “everything that can be taken as a sign.”229 A sign is 
simply a thing that stands for something else. Although it has its 
origins in the study of language, semiotic analysis is a trans-
linguistic activity230 that can be applied to the inquiry of “[a sys-
tem] of structural codes . . . that engages with culture, consump-
tion, and communication in the marketplace.”231 The Swiss lin-
guist, Ferdinand de Saussure is widely credited as the most influen-
tial scholar in the field of semiotics. He emphasized the nature of 
the sign as the coded association of a material signifier, such as the 
sound of a word, with a signified or preconceived meaning.232 In his 
oft-cited work on the semiotic analyses of consumer cultures, My-
thologies, Roland Barthes explains that “any semiology postulates a 
relation between two terms, a signifier and a signified”233 and that a 
sign “is the associative total of the first two terms.”234 A well-
known literary or artistic work does much more than simply edu-
cate, inform, or entertain, but it also functions as a signifier of a set 
of signified meanings. While there is much debate over the extent of 
copyright protection given to fictional literary characters outside of 
the context of the works in which they appear, cartoon characters 
in meticulously drawn comic books usually have no problem being 
categorized as pictorial or graphic works235 that fall within “the 
core of the copyright’s protective purposes.”236 Mickey Mouse, 
Barbie, Captain America, and Superman are just some of the iconic 
characters from the last century that are universally recognized to-
day; each is emblematic of a unique set of character values and se-
miotic significance and has become a “common [point] of refer-
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ence for millions of individuals who may never interact with one 
another, but who share, by virtue of their participation in a me-
diated culture [as the audience], a common experience and a col-
lective memory.”237 The representative fictional characters from 
the works—for example, Mickey Mouse, Snow White, and Sleep-
ing Beauty from the canonical universe of Disney’s works—may 
function as signifiers of both individualized and a shared set of 
meanings. A “myth” is thereby created when meaning within a 
semiological system is transformed into form as represented by a 
sign;238 each sign becomes naturally associated with a set of mean-
ings or “historical intention”239 which is ultimately consumed. 
Like famous trademarks, the copyrighted character signifi-
er/signified relationship would have become universally codified 
for the audience; the audience will automatically and consistently 
think of the coded meanings and values (the signified) when they 
are exposed to the character signifiers. In other words, the fictional 
character becomes a sign for a predetermined set of cultural codes 
and audience experiences associated with the work or the author of 
the work.240 It has been noted: 
If anyone who wanted to could appropriate a cultur-
al object, transform it according to her own whims, 
and rerelease it into society, the result could be a 
win-win scenario for First Amendment values: sig-
nificantly improved personal autonomy combined 
with democracy-reinforcing political expression . . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . More fundamentally, the loss of radical 
voices and ideas hurts the marketplace of ideas and 
the First Amendment maxim “that everything 
worth saying shall be said.”241 
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Referring to Barthes’ work on modern myths,242 as well as to 
Antonio Gramsci243 and Claude Lévi-Strauss,244 Stuart Hall dis-
cusses the politics of signification245 and how ideological discourses 
of a particular society are classified and framed through semiotic 
signs.246 Like Barthesian myths, cartoon characters such as Mickey 
Mouse and Snow White, well-known superhero characters such as 
Superman, Captain America, and Wonder Woman, as well as fic-
tional characters from popular television series like Star Trek, all 
contain subject positions and models for identification that are 
heavily coded ideologically. These iconic copyrighted works can 
have an ideological function of not only reiterating dominant val-
ues, but also concealing prevalent contradictions or social prob-
lems. More generally, it has been said that “identities can function 
as points of identification and attachment only because of their ca-
pacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’ abjected.”247 In 
particular, Eleanor Byrne and Martin McQuillan argued that the 
“Disney [text] has become synonymous with a certain conserva-
tive, patriarchal, heterosexual ideology which is loosely associated 
with American cultural imperialism.”248 The canon of Disney films 
has been said to “open themselves onto the entire history of the 
West and act as a symptomatic concentration of all the ideological 
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contests which are currently being fought in our world today.”249 
Indeed many of Disney’s texts present fertile opportunities for op-
posite or subversive readings that disrupt the hegemony of a hyper-
realist utopian escapism. In terms of recoding, scholars like John 
Fiske have emphasized the potential of audience reconstruction of 
dominant symbols of a culture. Fiske coined the term “semiotic 
democracy” to describe a world where empowered audiences free-
ly and widely engage in the use of cultural symbols to express 
meanings that are different from the ones intended by their crea-
tors.250 Sarah Trombley had also expressed concerns about why, in 
order to be able to speak effectively, one needs to be able to appro-
priate and transform the work of others: 
In the United States, more and more powerful, 
widely-recognized symbols and icons have become 
private property even as corporations invest billions 
of dollars in ensuring that they saturate public dis-
course. We are in danger of creating an impove-
rished “look, but don’t touch” world, one in which 
the very public whose enthusiastic response to cer-
tain symbols and icons gives them their resonance 
cannot use those symbols and icons themselves to 
communicate—a sad inversion of the copyright re-
gime’s original goal of enriching the stock of Ameri-
can culture.251 
The writings of Rosemary Coombe252 and Michael Warner253 
on subaltern groups and counterpublics have approached the con-
stitution and politics of social and individual identity as being pre-
dicated on a power struggle between dominant and subordinate 
groups. The terms “subaltern” or “subculture” are frequently 
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used in cultural studies to denote the subordination of particular 
identities by a dominant ideological hegemony; the “subaltern’s 
place [in society] is subsumed within . . . an experience of oppres-
sion which privileges particular exemplars as the ‘proper’ figures 
of identity.”254 Warner’s analysis of the struggles that bring indi-
viduals together as a public postulates that “subaltern counterpub-
lics” usually articulate alternative power relations with the domi-
nant public defined by race, gender, sexual orientation, and other 
subordinated status.255 According to Warner, a counterpublic 
maintains “an awareness of its subordinate status . . . [with respect] 
not just to ideas or policy questions but to the speech genres and 
mode of address that constitute the public.”256 
Stuart Hall has also defined the taking of an existing meaning 
and reappropriating it for new meanings as “trans-coding.”257 He 
explained that repressed groups may use trans-coding strategies to 
reverse stereotypes, substitute negative portrayals with positive 
ones, or contest subordinate representations from within.258 This 
notion of recoding is arguably applicable to the transformation doc-
trine in the fair use defense of copyright law. In copyright fair use, 
the pertinent inquiry for transformativeness is whether the second-
ary work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.”259 Many trans-coding practices, especially in appropriation 
art, can be said to be “transformative” in this way.260 A counter-
cultural or counterpublic agenda may be best communicated to 
                                                                                                                            
254 Id. at 92. 
255 Id. at 44–63, 117–20. 
256 Id. at 119. 
257 Stuart Hall, The Spectacle of the “Other,” in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL 
REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 223, 270 (1997). The term 
“transfunctionalize” has also been used to describe how subcultures assign new and often 
contradictory meanings to signs as understood by mainstream society. See PAUL 
NATHANSON, OVER THE RAINBOW: THE WIZARD OF OZ AS A SECULAR MYTH OF AMERICA 
241 (1991). 
258 Hall, supra note 257, at 270–75. 
259 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
260 See generally David Tan, What Do Judges Know About Contemporary Art?: Richard 
Prince and Reimagining the Fair Use Test in Copyright Law, 16 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 381 
(2011); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Legal Protection of Postmodern Art, in 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 254 (2003). 
2016] LOST LANGUAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 365 
 
mainstream society through the use of widely recognized semiotic 
signs to which the public have ascribed particular representative 
values or characteristics. Hence “recoding, like flag burning, may 
advance an ‘associative’ type of discourse using the currency of 
symbolic referents . . . [realizing] its potential for promoting per-
sonal expression, self-government, and the pursuit of truth.”261 In 
the area of copyright, parodies, fan fiction, and appropriation art 
are the best examples of trans-coding practices where an irreverent 
portrayal of an iconic literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work 
has recoded its semiotic meanings to express a different or counter-
viewpoint that creates new insights and understandings, thus ren-
dering the secondary use “transformative” in nature. Rebecca 
Tushnet explains that fans add new characters, stories, or twists to 
the existing versions of novels and television programs: 
Rather than displacing sales of the original, fan-
works encourage and sustain a vibrant fan commu-
nity that helps authorized versions thrive—Harry 
Potter, CSI, Star Trek, and other successful works 
are at the center of enormous creative fandoms con-
taining hundreds of thousands of fanworks . . . . 
Transformativeness in fanworks takes many forms, 
from critique to celebration to reworking a text so 
that it better addresses the concerns of a specific 
audience.262 
Indeed, one of the most prevalent creative practices of fan 
communities is “transformation by excavation,”263 where new fan 
works creatively illuminate something about the originals by re-
working the canonical versions. I have previously maintained that 
“in their interpretive activities, fans may arguably, as fair use, 
comment or criticize the canonical universe of the original author, 
create parodies of the original works or to express their own crea-
tive teleologies that draw on the primacy of the canon.”264 As 
Tushnet contends, if a work was used as a building block for an ar-
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gument, it should be understood as possessing a transformative 
purpose, in contrast to a work that was created purely for its enter-
tainment value.265 Randall Bezanson similarly argues that adopting 
other people’s speech should be protected by the First Amend-
ment when it is “sufficiently transformative to support the asser-
tion of intent to speak for oneself and, as importantly, to identify a 
new expression that justifies calling the First Amendment into 
play.”266 
C. Advancing First Amendment Goals Through Semiotic 
Transformation 
In trademark law, courts have often directly engaged with the 
First Amendment, whether in an infringement or a dilution claim, 
as trademark law does not have a built-in First Amendment safe-
guard. Hence, courts have resorted to accommodating the First 
Amendment within doctrinal grounds, like in the likelihood of con-
fusion analysis for infringement and the non-commercial use and 
parody exceptions for dilution actions.267 For instance, the Second 
Circuit noted that since the likelihood of confusion test “is at best 
awkward in the context of parody, which must evoke the original 
and constitutes artistic expression,” courts should apply the fac-
tors “with proper weight given to First Amendment considera-
tions.”268 The Ninth Circuit in Mattel v. MCA Records commented 
that when marks “transcend their identifying purpose” and “enter 
public discourse and become an integral part of our vocabulary,” 
they “assume[] a role outside the bounds of trademark law.”269 
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Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amend-
ment protections come into play. In these situations, the Ninth 
Circuit observed that “the trademark owner does not have the 
right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues his 
mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.”270 
More broadly, the court cautioned: “Were we to ignore the expres-
sive value that some marks assume, trademark rights would grow to 
encroach upon the zone protected by the First Amendment.”271 
Similarly, the First Circuit shares the view that “[t]rademark rights 
do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark 
by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of 
view.”272 
Mattel, through impressive marketing, has established Barbie 
as “the ideal American woman” and a “symbol of American girl-
hood” for many.273 To sell its product, Mattel uses associations of 
beauty, wealth, and glamour. In Mattel v. Walking Mountain Produc-
tions, artist Thomas Forsythe turns this image on its head by dis-
playing carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking 
Barbies in often ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations. In 
finding that Thomas Forsythe’s photographs, which portrayed a 
nude Barbie doll in danger of being attacked by vintage household 
appliances, was transformative, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
“Forsythe presents the viewer with a different set of associations 
and a different context for this plastic figure.”274 The court com-
mented: 
It is not difficult to see the commentary that For-
sythe intended or the harm that he perceived in 
Barbie’s influence on gender roles and the position 
of women in society . . . . By developing and trans-
forming associations with Mattel’s Barbie doll, For-
sythe has created the sort of social criticism and pa-
                                                                                                                            
onto “Top 40” music charts. The defendants, MCA Records and a number of other 
music companies, produced, marketed, and sold “Barbie Girl.” Id. 
270 Id.; see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
271 MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 900. 
272 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1987). 
273 MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d at 898. 
274 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir. 2003). 
368 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:311 
 
rodic speech protected by the First Amendment and 
promoted by the Copyright Act.275 
Courts rarely refer to the First Amendment when evaluating 
transformative use in copyright disputes. However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Mattel decisions are notable for their more overt mention of 
the protection that the First Amendment confers over commen-
tary, criticism, and parody that may be affected by engaging with a 
copyrighted work as a semiotic sign infused with established con-
notations. The Fourth Circuit alluded to the marketplace of ideas 
and participatory democracy rationales of the First Amendment 
when it posited that fair use “protects filmmakers and documenta-
rians from the inevitable chilling effects of allowing an artist too 
much control over the dissemination of his or her work” and “is 
crucial to the exchange of opinions and ideas.”276 
It seems that the Supreme Court is not too concerned about 
keeping the marketplace of ideas and the participatory democracy 
theory distinct, as evident in its frequent pronouncements. For ex-
ample, the Court stated that the First Amendment “was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people”277 and to enable 
“the practice of persons sharing common views banding together 
to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American po-
litical process.”278 Generally, political speech covers all discussion 
on public issues, especially if intended by the speaker to influence 
governmental action.279 Political speech has been defined by com-
mentators as speech that falls into one of the following categories: 
either it (1) is “a reasoned, cognitive connection to some identifia-
ble political issue that has the potential of entering the legislative 
arena”;280 (2) is that “which bears, directly or indirectly, upon is-
sues with which voters have to deal”;281 or (3) occurs “when it is 
                                                                                                                            
275 Id. at 803. 
276 Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013). 
277 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 269 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
278 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 906 (1982). 
279 Id. at 913–14; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 
at 270. 
280 Garry, supra note 126, at 516. 
281 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 118, at 79. 
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both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation 
about some issue.”282 Although art and entertainment, as embo-
died in literary, musical, dramatic, and artistic works, are protected 
by the First Amendment as having value in themselves, courts of-
ten examine their “political value.” This is demonstrated by deci-
sions that assess their contribution to public debate through the 
articulation of a particular viewpoint or through critical commen-
tary or parody.283 The transformative use doctrine can clearly ac-
commodate the First Amendment rationales of marketplace of 
ideas and participatory democracy, where greater protection may 
be given to unauthorized uses of copyrighted works that promote 
attention to public issues and engender public debate. 
In order for speech to be accommodated adequate breathing 
space, it would be beneficial to understand the free speech issues in 
the copyright fair use defense within the context of a First 
Amendment theory that “preserves the independence of public 
discourse so that a democratic will within a culturally heterogene-
ous state can emerge under conditions of neutrality, and so that 
individuals can use the medium of public discourse to persuade 
others to experiment in new forms of community life.”284 Instead 
of burning a flag or a cross, or wearing black armbands, one might 
draw Mouseketeer caps on President Obama’s head or depict Su-
perman being crushed by foreign powers when engaging in political 
commentary. Gays and lesbians may subvert conventional portray-
als of Disney’s princes and princesses to highlight their social mar-
ginalization. A number of commentators have alluded to this possi-
bility. For example, Trombley suggests that the view put forth in 
“slash fanvid” may “require a radical reappraisal of characters’ 
motives, the plot, and authorial intent . . . [and] also demonstrates 
the ways in which such transformative use edges towards political 
commentary that may deserve protection under the First Amend-
ment.”285 
                                                                                                                            
282 SUNSTEIN, PROBLEM WITH FREE SPEECH, supra note 137, at 130. 
283 In a right of publicity context, see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
284 Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 136, at 684. 
285 Trombley, supra note 251, at 665–66. The fan-made music video, or “fanvid,” 
comprises of the re-cutting of footage from a television or film source to a new 
soundtrack, thus producing a sequence resembling a movie trailer (although normally 
370 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:311 
 
In the United States, the “structural barriers or limits of class 
[that] would obstruct [the] process of cultural absorption” have 
not assisted the “democratic enfranchisement of all citizens within 
political society.”286 Reading copyrighted works semiotically can 
reveal how such signs can “reproduce the existing social struggles 
in their images, spectacle, and narrative.”287 Indeed, there is a sig-
nificant emphasis in contemporary cultural studies on the notion of 
audience participation—be it their complicity or resistance—in the 
hegemony of cultural texts propagated by their authors or produc-
ers.288 It is in these studies of semiotic disruptions that one may 
find the relevant tools for establishing a conceptual framework 
within the transformative use doctrine that addresses the political 
agenda of the active audience. 
In right of publicity jurisprudence, the First Amendment de-
fense is a shield against liability for the commercial appropriation of 
identity.289 There are different articulations of the First Amend-
ment defense in myriad state jurisdictions, but the “transformative 
elements” test, also known as the “transformative use” test, in-
itiated by the California Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions v. 
Saderup290 has been widely adopted.291 It draws from the first factor 
                                                                                                                            
omitting dialogue or voice-over narration) or the “musical montage,” which often ends 
episodes of television dramas. The popular subgenre of “slash” fanvids explores the 
possibility of reading relationships between presumptively (by mainstream standards) 
heterosexual characters as queer. Fanvids are therefore perceived as a form of cultural 
appropriation by individual artists who transform the works of others for different ends. 
Id. at 650–52. 
286 Stuart Hall, supra note 245, at 56, 60. 
287 DOUGLAS KELLNER, MEDIA CULTURE: CULTURAL STUDIES, IDENTITY AND POLITICS 
BETWEEN THE MODERN AND THE POSTMODERN 56 (1995). 
288 See NICK ABERCROMBIE & BRIAN LONGHURST, AUDIENCES: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY OF PERFORMANCE AND IMAGINATION (1998); IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING 
THE AUDIENCE (1991); AUDIENCES AND PUBLICS: WHEN CULTURAL ENGAGEMENT 
MATTERS FOR THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Sonia Livingstone ed., 2005); JOHN FISKE, MEDIA 
MATTERS: EVERYDAY CULTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1996); JONATHAN GRAY, 
WATCHING WITH THE SIMPSONS: TELEVISION, PARODY, AND INTERTEXTUALITY (2006). 
289 See MCCARTHY, supra note 114, §§ 3:1, 8:22–:39 (2014); Tan, Political Recoding, 
supra note 228, at 17–30. 
290 Comedy III Prods. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
291 See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 
717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010); 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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of the fair use defense in copyright law:292 an unauthorized use of 
celebrity identity would be permitted if it was “transformative.” In 
adjudging what might qualify as “transformative” and hence pro-
tected by the First Amendment, literal depictions like Andy War-
hol’s silkscreens of celebrities have been said to be transformative 
because they convey a particular critical viewpoint.293 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court commented that despite a low degree of visual 
transformation in the silkscreens, “[t]hrough distortion and the 
careful manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a mes-
sage that went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity im-
ages and became a form of ironic social comment on the dehumani-
zation of celebrity itself.”294 This suggests that contextual trans-
formations—like the recoded use of a celebrity identity to chal-
lenge the majoritarian values that the celebrity sign represents—
would merit First Amendment protection. 
Building on Jürgen Habermas’ work on the public sphere,295 
Michael Warner’s analysis of the struggles that bring individuals 
together as a public postulates that “subaltern counterpublics” 
usually articulate alternative power relations with the dominant 
public defined by race, gender, sexual orientation, and other subor-
dinated status.296 Counterpublics are “counter” to the extent that 
they try to supply different ways of imagining participation within a 
political or social hierarchy by which its members’ identities are 
formed and transformed.297 A counterpublic use of a particular 
well-known copyrighted work can acquire a political dimension, 
and may be seen as a “discursive space . . . for contesting and en-
                                                                                                                            
292 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–85 (1994); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 
1268–69 (11th Cir. 2011); Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 251–56 (2d Cir. 2006); Castle Rock 
Entm’t v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1998). 
293 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 811. The court observed that “the transformative elements or 
creative contributions that require First Amendment protection are not confined to 
parody and can take many forms, from factual reporting to fictionalized portrayal, from 
heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social criticism.” Id. at 809. 
294 Id. at 811. 
295 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 1989). 
296 WARNER, supra note 253, at 44–63, 117–20. 
297 Id. at 121–22. 
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gendering the American character.”298 From a semiotics perspec-
tive, the political agenda of counterpublics or subaltern groups may 
be best communicated to mainstream society through the use of 
widely recognized copyrighted works as “signs” to which the pub-
lic have ascribed particular representative values or characteristics. 
In particular, copyrighted works that are constitutive of cultural 
heritage—like Mickey Mouse, Superman, Captain America, and 
Barbie—each transcend the works that bear these names, and are 
symbolic of the ideological hegemonies of social identities in con-
temporary society. Their recoding by counterpublics may be 
viewed as “[p]ractices of articulating social difference [that] are 
central to democratic politics.”299 
Through recoding practices—which transform the original 
work through the creation of “new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings”300—subaltern groups are able to 
advance their political ideologies and assert alternative identities 
that “affirm both community solidarity and the legitimacy of their 
social difference by empowering themselves with cultural resources 
that the law deems the properties of others.”301 The rewriting of 
the well-known Roy Orbison hit song “Oh, Pretty Woman” to re-
fer to a “big hairy woman” and a “bald headed woman” reasona-
bly could be perceived as commenting on or criticizing the notions 
of beauty or naiveté suggested by the original work.302 Similarly, 
the spoof of Annie Leibovitz’s celebrity portrait,303 the poignant 
                                                                                                                            
298 Madhavi Sunder, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The Intellectual 
Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 
49 STAN. L. REV. 143, 164–65 (1996). 
299 COOMBE, supra note 252, at 295; see also WARNER, supra note 253, at 210. 
300 Leval, supra note 28, at 1111. 
301 COOMBE, supra note 252, at 366; see also Jacqueline D. Lipton & John Tehranian, 
Derivative Works 2.0: Reconsidering Transformative Use in the Age of Crowdsourced Creation, 
109 NW. U.L. REV. 383, 401 (2015) (“transformative interactions with creative works also 
advance identity formation and expressive interests by mediating the development of 
cultural networks, regulating or undermining insider-outsider relationships, and 
demarcating or blurring social strata”). 
302 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
303 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Apart from 
ridiculing pretentiousness, the ad might also be reasonably perceived as interpreting the 
Leibovitz photograph to extol the beauty of the pregnant female body, and rather 
unchivalrously, to express disagreement with this message.”). 
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retelling of Gone With The Wind,304 the subversive criticism of Mat-
tel’s depiction of the Barbie doll by Thomas Forsythe,305 the new 
insights to Andreas Blanch’s fashion photograph provided by Jeff 
Koons,306 and the new aesthetics of Richard Prince’s appropriation 
art307 not only contribute significantly to the marketplace of ideas 
but also challenge majoritarian viewpoints and provoke public de-
bate about American ideals and values. Although these decisions 
regarding fair use do not refer to the First Amendment, one can 
discern its subliminal presence guiding the interpretation of trans-
formative use that impels a march toward finding more breathing 
space for secondary works that advance First Amendment goals. 
Viewed in this light, the judgment handed down in 1978 by the 
Ninth Circuit in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates would have 
been wrongly decided; in that case, the individual defendants pub-
lished two issues of cartoon comics entitled Air Pirates Funnies 
which portrayed a number of well-recognized Disney characters in 
unflattering scenarios. The themes of defendants’ publications dif-
fer markedly from those of Disney. The Ninth Circuit advanced 
the observation that: 
[T]he “Air Pirates” was “an ‘underground’ comic 
book which had placed several well-known Disney 
                                                                                                                            
304 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011) (“It is 
principally and purposefully a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the 
perspective, judgments, and mythology of [the original novel].”). 
305 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating 
that Forsythe, the defendant, described the message of his photographic series as “an 
attempt to ‘critique [] the objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and [][to] 
lambast [] the conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects 
because this is what Barbie embodies.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
306 Koons II, 467 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The sharply different objectives that 
Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating ‘Silk Sandals’ confirms the transformative 
nature of the use.”). According to Jeff Koons, he was “using Blanch’s image as fodder for 
his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media” and he wanted 
“the viewer to think about his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and 
images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.” Id. at 252–
53. 
307 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Prince’s Canal Zone artworks 
relate to a ‘post-apocalyptic screenplay’ Prince had planned, and ‘emphasize themes [of 
Prince’s planned screenplay] of equality of the sexes; highlight “the three relationships in 
the world, which are men and women, men and men, and women and women”; and 
portray a contemporary take on the music scene.’”). 
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cartoon characters in incongruous settings where 
they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the 
accepted Mickey Mouse world of scrubbed faces, 
bright smiles and happy endings.” It centered 
around “a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney 
characters as active members of a free thinking, 
promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.”308 
Each issue of the Pirates’ books was marked “Adults Only.” 
The cover of the first issue showed Mickey Mouse piloting an 
open-cockpitted, propeller-powered plane with two sacks labeled 
“Dope” tied to its fuselage. The image has been lifted from the 
cover of a Disney comic, Mickey the Mail Pilot, with the word 
“Dope” having replaced the original word, “Mail.” The cover of 
the second issue depicted Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse on 
horseback, hands raised, confronted by a bat-winged, cloaked fig-
ure with a revolver in one hand and the “Dope” sacks in the other. 
The Ninth Circuit accepted that the Air Pirates Funnies had tar-
geted the original Disney characters and had “parodied their per-
sonalities, their wholesomeness, and their innocence.”309 This is 
therefore unequivocally a target parody310 and like 2 Live Crew’s 
song “Pretty Woman” in Campbell, it “reasonably could be per-
ceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some de-
gree.”311 In fact, the defense attorneys for Air Pirates argued that 
the creators of Air Pirates Funnies were respected parodists follow-
ing in the footsteps of Cervantes, Swift, Whitman, Hemingway, 
and Faulkner, that the countercultural comics were aimed at adult 
hippies not children, that these comics were not competing with 
                                                                                                                            
308 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Note, 
Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 564, 571, 582 (1976)). 
309 Walt Disney, 581 F.2d at 758. It was also noted that there were satirical elements 
present as well. Id. at 758 n.15 (“[T]he ‘Air Pirates’ were parodying life and society in 
addition to parodying the Disney characters. Such an effect is almost an inherent aspect of 
any parody.”). 
310 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (“For the purposes of 
copyright law, the nub of the definitions, and the heart of any parodist’s claim to quote 
from existing material, is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to 
create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.”). On the 
difference between target and weapon parodies, see Richard A. Posner, When is Parody 
Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 70–71 (1992). 
311 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583. 
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any past, current, or future Disney creations, and that the Disney-
buying public was unlikely to have its cravings for Mickey Mouse 
satisfied by an issue of Air Pirates Funnies.312 In Dan O’Neill’s affi-
davit, he said: 
[W]e approach Mickey Mouse as our major Ameri-
can mythology . . . . I chose to parody exactly the 
style of drawing and the characters to evoke the re-
sponse created by Disney. My purpose in using the 
Mouse as a character is not to destroy the Disney 
product, but to deal with the image in the American 
consciousness that the Disney image implanted.313 
Unfortunately, it was this close copying of the original Disney 
characters in Walt Disney that precluded the defendants from rely-
ing on the fair use defense, despite the high degree of transforma-
tiveness in terms of the parodic purpose of Air Pirates Funnies. 
In 1978, the standards for applying the fair use defense in paro-
dy cases, like the standards for applying fair use in other contexts, 
have been a source of considerable attention and dispute, with a 
number of Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit decisions consistently 
focused on the substantiality of the taking.314 In Walt Disney, the 
defendants presented a contrasting countercultural critical work 
that attacked the Disney myth. They argued that Mickey Mouse 
had become “part of the national collective unconscious” and an 
internationally known symbol of American culture and power; 
while Mickey is usually perceived as innocent and delightful, he 
has now been recoded in Air Pirates Funnies as a reactionary force 
devoted to Establishment values and an enthusiastic promoter of 
capitalism and unrestrained violence,315 a representation which 
challenged the morality espoused by Disney. Today, such a use 
                                                                                                                            
312 BOB LEVIN, THE PIRATES AND THE MOUSE: DISNEY’S WAR AGAINST THE 
COUNTERCULTURE 98 (2003). 
313 Id. at 100. O’Neill was also reported to have said: “The closer you draw the parody, 
the greater the shock, the greater the criticism.” Id. at 101. 
314 E.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). 
315 LEVIN, supra note 312, at 98–99. 
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would probably qualify as a form of “transformation by excava-
tion.”316 
In the same vein, the placement of a Mouseketeer cap on the 
President of the United States or the former Chairman of the Chi-
nese Communist Party would infringe Disney’s copyright in the 
graphical image of Mickey Mouse. It is a perfect shorthand to ex-
press one’s criticism of the incumbent political ideology.317 Disney 
can connote “unquestioning patriotism, bourgeois moral nostrums, 
gauche middle-class taste, racist elitism, corporate profit-
mongering, and bland standards of social conformity.”318 Such ex-
pressions also may, borrowing a phrase from the Supreme Court in 
Campbell, “reasonably be perceived as commenting on the original 
or criticizing it, to some degree,”319 through the introduction of 
new insights and understandings into the Disney corporation’s 
close connection with governments320 and Disney’s highly success-
ful “mass-mediated utopian typifications . . . that structure person-
al values and ideology,”321 much like how these two political lead-
ers strive to advance democratic and communist dogmas respec-
tively in their own countries. 
Likewise, the myth of the American superheroes as portrayed 
in Marvel and DC Comics can also be read to encompass a secula-
rization of religion and the themes of salvation and redemption.322 
The powers that are earlier reserved for God and his angelic beings 
are transferred to an Everyman, and the virtuous qualities asso-
ciated with God now reside within the superheroes. Richard Rey-
                                                                                                                            
316 Tushnet, supra note 262, at 503. 
317 Such countercultural merchandise is currently commercially available for purchase 
on websites. See, e.g., THOSESHIRTS.COM, http://www.thoseshirts.com/mic.html 
[http://perma.cc/FG6P-XARR] (last visited Oct. 12, 2015); TSHIRTBORDELLO.COM, 
http://www.tshirtbordello.com/Mickey-Mao-T-Shirt [http://perma.cc/459W-Z4NZ] 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
318 LEVIN, supra note 312, at 79; see also Lee Artz, Monarchs, Monsters, and 
Multiculturalism: Disney’s Menu for Global Hierarchy, in RETHINKING DISNEY: PRIVATE 
CONTROL, PUBLIC DIMENSION 75, 82 (Mike Budd & Max H. Kirsch eds., 2005) (arguing 
that Disney’s representations “promote capitalist hegemony and political quiescence”). 
319 Campbell v. Acuff-Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
320 See LEVIN, supra note 312, at 73. 
321 MICHAEL REAL, MASS-MEDIATED CULTURE 84 (1973). 
322 ROBERT JEWETT & JOHN SHELTON LAWRENCE, THE MYTH OF THE AMERICAN 
SUPERHERO 44 (2002). 
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nolds observes that “[f]or Americans, the historical path from Mu-
nich to Pearl Harbor coincides with the emergence of Superman 
and Captain America—solitary but socialized heroes who engage in 
battle from time to time as proxies of U.S. foreign policy.”323 
These myths or semiotic connotations of Superman as the idealiza-
tion of a heroic America, with its messianic overtones and both 
Captain America and Wonder Woman as emblems of American 
patriotism, are well-recognized by readers of DC and Marvel Com-
ics around the world. Here, myths refer not simply to a falsehood, 
but to narrative tales which “function to express social values, 
norms of behaviors, and/or the consequences of deviating from 
them.”324 As themes of political content, power and responsibility, 
ability and disability, good and evil, as well as gender and eroticism 
continue to be explored through the semiotic signs of the superhe-
roes, it is evident that different sets of moral, social, and ideological 
positions are personified by different superhero characters. It is 
upon the bedrock of the Golden Age of Superheroes created in the 
1930s–1940s—like Superman, Batman, Captain America, and 
Wonder Woman—that other artistic works spring to challenge, 
deconstruct, and satirize these well-known modern myths. Artist 
R. Sumantri MS’s controversial works in the China New Supreme 
Power series depict a number of battle scenes between the Golden 
Age superheroes and well-known Chinese deities all resulting in a 
devastating defeat of the American heroes.325 This postmodern po-
litical commentary of the ascendancy of China and the decline of 
the United States as a global superpower is most effectively con-
veyed through the use of these superheroes whose semiotic mean-
ings are arguably universally recognized. Such infringing uses of 
copyrighted characters in political speech would undoubtedly 
summon the attention of the First Amendment, and its recognition 
as such would add significantly to a more nuanced analysis of the 
fair use defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
It might be correct that “[b]ecause of the First Amendment 
principles built into copyright law through the idea/expression di-
chotomy and the doctrine of fair use, courts often need not enter-
tain related First Amendment arguments in a copyright case.”326 
But what this built-in accommodation entails is an obviation for the 
need for a separate or additional judicial scrutiny of copyright legis-
lation so long as the doctrines of idea/expression dichotomy and 
fair use remain undisturbed. It does not mean that the rationales of 
the First Amendment or the degree of abridgment of speech should 
be completely ignored when evaluating fair use. 
Leval’s legacy has lasted twenty-five years and it is likely to 
continue to be the engine that will drive fair use jurisprudence in 
the Supreme Court and a majority of the Circuit Courts. The free-
dom to transformatively appropriate an original work in the service 
of creativity is not only compatible with the objectives of the Copy-
right Clause, but also advances the goals of the First Amendment. 
The first thing that usually springs to mind when one mentions 
books, songs, films, and art is how a restriction on their circulation 
might trespass on the First Amendment. Yet for the past two dec-
ades, the courts have deliberately skirted around any discussion of 
the First Amendment when addressing liability for copyright in-
fringement. 
The participatory theory of the First Amendment supports the 
protection of the making of “representations about self, identity, 
community, solidarity, and difference” or the articulation of politi-
cal and social aspirations using these copyright signs within a “di-
                                                                                                                            
326 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that where the works in 
question are “by definition under copyright,” the works are “on the latter half of the 
‘idea/expression dichotomy’ [which] makes them subject to fair use. This obviates 
further inquiry under the First Amendment.”); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline 
Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We have repeatedly rejected First 
Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground that 
First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use 
doctrine.”); L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (“First 
Amendment concerns are also addressed in the copyright field through the ‘fair use’ 
doctrine.”). 
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alogic democracy”327 as political speech. In First Amendment juri-
sprudence, certain recoded circulations can be viewed as a form of 
political activism characterized by their ability to “reverse percep-
tions of social devaluation or stigma, articulate alternative narra-
tives of national understanding, and challenge exclusionary imagi-
naries of citizenship.”328 Propertizing expressive works enables the 
owner to restrict speech, impede the free flow of ideas, and control 
democratic dialogue. Copyright laws should ultimately aim to 
strike a balance between protecting, on the one hand, the proprie-
tary right of the author/creator to economically exploit the fruits of 
his labor, and on the other hand, the right of others to proffer alter-
native insights, create new understandings, and express political 
viewpoints through connotative recoded uses of the copyrighted 
sign. It is only by reimagining the world of copyright as a semiotic 
universe that “the promise of First Amendment”329 can be unders-
tood and its lost language recovered. 
                                                                                                                            
327 COOMBE, supra note 252, at 248–49. 
328 Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 32 (D.D.C. 2006). 
329 LANGE & POWELL, supra note 210, at 124. 
